


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18 February 1986

Near East/South Asia Report



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18 February 1986

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

PAPER BLASTS SOVIETS: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

Attempt to Correct Soviet Delegate's Vote

Montreal HORIZON in Armenian 16 Dec 86 p 1

[Text] This article refers to an attention-getting article, reprinted (in this newspaper) from the 22 November 1985 issue of GRAKAN TERT, which had appeared in the 18 November issue of the Soviet daily newspaper IZVESTIYA, an abbreviated English version of which we received practically simultaneously from the Soviet Information Bureau in Ottawa.

...the article was specifically written as a response to the commotion which was aroused by the negative position taken by the Soviet delegation at the August session of the UN Human Rights Subcommittee in Geneva. The vote against adoption of Whittikare's document was interpreted by many (including us) as an objection to recognition of the fact of the Armenian Genocide. The author of the article in IZVESTIYA, although he employs a technique of criticizing the author of the document and the document proper for various errors -- to justify Sofinskiy's "subject matter", the main thing is the fact that he clearly and without mincing words, be it at the beginning or the end of the article, takes a position against distortion of history and for acknowledging the Great Armenian Massacre as a Genocide. This attempt to set the record straight is welcome. We hope that the Soviet authorities will acknowledge that the Armenian people, the homeland of whom is today one of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union, rightly expects that under no circumstances, in no way and for no reason whatsoever, should the fact of the Armenian Genocide be placed in doubt on the part of their representatives, but on the contrary, that the Soviet Union itself should stand as defender of the Armenian Cause and put its international weight behind efforts to regain the lands which comprise the homeland of the Armenian people.

We take this occasion to reprint an excerpt of the article "Better Late Than Never," carried by our fellow newspaper KAMK.

The above-mentioned explanation is of course satisfactory to the Armenian people, and the matter can be considered closed. Sometimes it is "better late than never." But why could not Sofinskiy himself have given the exhaustive explanation carried in IZVESTIYA at the time the vote was taken? Why did he not declare right on the spot that the Soviet Union has always recognized and condemned the genocide of the Armenians, but that the genocide is addressed together with points which are unacceptable to the Soviet Union? With such a statement, Sofinskiy could have prevented the uproar created in the Diaspora, which the Soviet Union, which considers itself a friend of the Armenian people, should have foreseen.

3024

CSO: 4605/20

Ministry of Finance:

Credits voted in 1985: 1,252.450 million dinars.

Proposed credits for 1986: 1,446.150 million dinars.

Joint expenditure budget:

Credits voted in 1985: 25,197.552 million dinars.

Proposed credits for 1986: 23,384.477 million dinars.

In its analysis of the budget funds for the Presidency of the Republic, the Planning and Finance Committee notes that for 1986, the amount is increasing only very slightly despite the new provisions regarding social security, lump sum payments, and social action, which required the addition of a supplementary envelope totaling nearly 28 million dinars. The committee report also notes that the results achieved by the Commissariat for New Energies deserve to be emphasized. In a period of 4 years, the country has acquired a basic scientific and technological potential that is vitally important for consolidating the country's economic independence and ensuring its industrial future.

The APN's Planning and Finance Committee also draws attention to the complete Algerianization of personnel in the fields of research, training, and execution as well as the use of local means of execution thanks to closer relations with enterprises, universities, and national organizations, with which numerous research and development protocols and cooperation agreements have already been signed.

Concerning the budget funds for the Ministry of National Defense, the Planning and Finance Committee emphasizes the role played in economic development by the National Service, whose participation in the building of railroad infrastructures is particularly important. It will be necessary to consolidate the experience gained and make it profitable by mobilizing adequate human and material means.

Special mention is made of the results achieved in operations to develop the southern part of the country, particularly in the Tamanrasset region. Those results have made it possible to increase agricultural production noticeably and to satisfy local needs.

The experience gained will benefit the local inhabitants, whose agricultural traditions are limited, and it is to be extended to the other regions of the country involved in the vast development program.

Concerning the budget funds allocated to the Ministry of Justice, the Planning and Finance Committee feels that the efforts already made must be intensified to ensure rapid achievement of the objective of decentralization as called for in the law of 23 June 1984 regarding judicial districts. Particular attention is paid to the increase in the number of administrative courts. The nature of the litigation they are called upon to handle requires the presence of good-quality personnel and an adequate provision of the necessary resources.

reporter for the assembly's special committee spoke in succession to provide the answers and clarifications requested by the deputies.

Continuing its examination of the state sector's budgets, the National People's Assembly will look this morning at the operating and equipment budgets of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Planning and National Development.

11798

CSO: 4519/38

not strictly medical in nature but social, hence the decisive role of society and particularly the family.

What is involved, therefore, is a drive to educate the public in every region of the country. The country will have to become acquainted with all the factors burdening the normal development of societies and, more specifically, the extremely negative consequences of an imbalance between a society's production capacity and its rate of population growth.

The organization of this second family planning week requires mobilization of the executive directorates in the governorates as well as the local party bodies, the mass organizations, and the professional unions.

Lastly, it must be noted that implementation of a coherent and active policy, based on a new approach involving the cooperation and mobilization of all available national energies with a view to controlling population growth, cannot be achieved without support by all the citizens and intervention by all public sectors. As a result, the deployment of all infrastructures and their operation nationwide should be carried on simultaneously with activities aimed at increasing awareness so as to achieve conscious and willing support on the part of the greatest number of inhabitants.

11798

CSO: 4519/38

The Economic integration as the one of the E.E.C. and its enlargement protect the rights of members and reduce the power of negotiations of others. [sentence as received] To avoid a degradation of their position, the developing countries must reinforce and adapt their legislation by introducing new laws on one side and on the other side think of regional integration projects in order to avoid to undergo the consequences of the others' strategy and safeguard a margin of manoeuvres without which the concept of sovereignty will lose its meaning.

/12913

CSO: 4500/66

VISIT OF JAPANESE COMMUNISTS--The discussions held in Algiers between FLN delegation and a Japanese Communist Party delegation which yesterday ended its visit to Algeria, were crowned with the following press statement: At an invitation of the FLN, a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party has made a working and friendly visit to Algeria from 13 to 19 January. It held political talks with a FLN delegation headed by the Brother Abderrezak Bouhara, member of the central committee permanent secretariat in charge of external relations. The two delegations have noted with satisfaction the relations existing between the two parties and agreed to strengthen the exchange of news about the activities of the two parties in order to consolidate the solidarity between them. The two delegations promised to continue and intensify the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, zionism, racism and all the forms of oppression, interference, and exploitation in order to end hegemony and inequality. [Text] [Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 20 Jan 86 LD] /12913

ALGERIAN DIPLOMATS SAFELY EVACUATED--President Chadli Benjadid had a telephone call this evening from 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the YAR. The two presidents had already spoken to each other in the early afternoon about the situation prevailing in the PDRY. A number of foreign nationals were evacuated from the PDRY today--nearly 1,000 of 25 different nationalities. Twelve members of the families of Algerian diplomats posted in Aden have been evacuated to Djibouti. This was learned in Algiers today from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it is also stated that the whole of the diplomatic staff and their families are safe and sound. [Excerpts] [Algiers Domestic Service in French 2200 GMT 18 Jan 86 LD] /19213

COOPERATION WITH ALBANIA--A cooperation agreement in the field of science and education for the years 1985 and 1986 was signed in Tirana between Algiers University of Science and Technology "Houari Boumediene" and "Enver Hoxha" University of Tirana. This agreement was signed by honorary rector of Algiers "Houari Boumedien" university, professor Mustapha Benhadef and Professor Osman Kraja rector of "Enver Hoxha" University. It is worth recalling that the Algerian delegation was [words indistinct] Albanian Minister of Education and Culture, Tefta Cami and visited scientific, social and cultural institutions. [Text] [Algiers APS in English 1008 GMT 25 Jan 86 LD] /12913

ALGERIA RECORDS 4.6-DEGREE EARTHQUAKE--At 2110 an earthquake was recorded this evening in the Al-Balaydah, (Bilda), area. Its intensity was estimated at 4.6 on the Richter scale. The research center on earth sciences (?and geology) at Buzarri'ah announced that the quake was preceded by two light tremors at about 1520 and it comes as an aftershock to the earthquake that was recorded in the Blida area on 10 January. [Text] [Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 19 Jan 86 LD] /12913

CSO: 4500/66

[Candar] Can Egypt be a moderating influence within the Nonaligned Movement as far as Cyprus is concerned? After all Egypt and the Greek Cypriot administration, which you call the "Cypriot Government," are both in the Nonaligned Movement.

['Abd al-Majid] I believe we are a moderate country in this region. It is our policy to prevent conflicts and to reconcile different views. At this point, I would like to refer to the Iran-Iraq conflict, which is a source of serious concern to us, to you, and to many countries in the region. We urge both sides to come to the negotiating table. While we have nothing against Iran, we essentially support Iraq. We feel that Iraq is paying greater attention to the peace efforts launched by the ICO.

[Candar] Do you expect anything from Turkey in terms of the Middle East and Palestinian questions? What kind of role do you expect it to play?

['Abd al-Majid] We would be extremely grateful if Turkey could promote peace efforts from inside the EEC. We look upon Turkey as a close friend of the Arab countries and, at the same time, as a member of the EEC. The submission of its views in the search for a just and peaceful settlement to the Palestinian issue would be extremely useful.

[Candar] What does peace process mean? Does it refer to the joint efforts being made by Jordan and Palestine?

['Abd al-Majid] The joint efforts of Jordan and Palestine are very important. They constitute the basis of the peace process.

[Candar] Is this initiative still alive?

['Abd al-Majid] I hope so. I am aware of the difficulties involved. As Egyptians, we are convinced that this initiative should be encouraged. We would be very happy if our Turkish brothers lent it their support.

/12712
CSO: 4500/62

EGYPT

INTERVIEW WITH EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION FIGURE

JN181200 Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Jan 86 pp 17, 16

[Article by Safwat Abu Talib]

[Excerpts] In a long, delicate, and exciting talk, Khalid Muhyi al-Din, secretary general of the opposition National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party in Egypt, speaks about several pan-Arab, international, regional, and national issues. In this exclusive interview, Muhyi al-Din demands that a meeting of the collective Arab Defense Pact be held with Egypt's participation because Egypt reiterates its commitment to defend its Arab nation. He says that the Camp David agreement is dead because it was based only on negotiations, arguments, and persuasion and ignored other pressure factors.

The following is the text of the interview.

SAWT AL-SHA'B: How do you view the cracks in the Arab world's facade?

Khalid: For example, if we take the 11 February 1985 Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, we find that it is based on all the UN resolutions. Therefore, the current pressure on the PLO to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 is meaningless. Egypt has always supported the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement. Then came the Cairo declaration with Egypt's blessing which included UN approval of the FES resolutions. [sentence as published]

The current political pressures on the PLO to accept Resolution 242 should not continue because Israel hit the PLO headquarters in Tunisia while knowing that the Abu Nidal [Sabri al-Banna] group is the party that is mainly responsible for all terrorist attacks. It is like the wolf and lamb story.

Therefore, I demand an immediate Arab summit in order to make a decision and counter Israeli and U.S. threats of aggression. In this summit, the Arab leaders should threaten to sever their relations with the United States and take political and economic stands against U.S. interests, in addition to making a simple, yet important and serious decision that is, preventing the establishment of any U.S. or other military bases in any part of the Arab region. The mere announcement of such a decision would change the international balance of power in the Arab nation's favor. This would keep the Arab region outside the stage of superpower struggle. Moreover, if the Arab summit considers the military strength of each Arab state, the Arabs would outweigh and be more powerful than Israel.

the Israeli military aggression against Sinai in 1967, and the USSR departed from Egypt before the 1973 October war. There is no danger from the Soviet military presence because it only comes on request. The Soviet military presence will remain in Syria until the Syrian forces' training in the missile bases is completed, and it will remain in Libya for the same reason. I believe that if the danger of war is gone there will be no Soviet presence. I also believe that a Soviet-U.S. balance in the Mediterranean will be in favor of the Arabs. This is in addition to my old belief that if the Arab world decides that there should be no foreign military bases in its territory the world balance of power will then change. If the balance of power is changed, the Middle East problem will be completely resolved. The biggest shortcoming of the Camp David accords was that it allowed us to enter the U.S. sphere of influence, which of course reinforces the preparations for a third world war. Nonsubservience and diversification will help move the Middle East and oil away from world conflict.

I would like to assert here that in light of this, work should continue to end the Iran-Iraq war. I believe that if all Arab countries announce that they will support and back Iraq, that war would stop. It is Israel which is now supporting Iran, and the United States gives its blessing to this. After this war, Iraq will have significant military experience and its army will be an important force in the Arab force. The Iraqi forces have good experience in war. Therefore, it is not fortuitous to say that Israel will not allow this war to stop until it solves the Middle East issue the way it wants to.

SAWT AL-SHA'B: How do you explain some Arab countries' support for Iran?

Khalid: Some people believe that the Iraqi Ba'th group will fight the Syrian Ba'th group. It has been proved that no outside war can topple any ruling regime. The evidence of this is Iran itself. The rule of the shah was not toppled by invasion. Foreign invasion usually helps unite the nation. I should say to everybody that we should end that war because Iraq will then become more support for the Arab force. In my opinion, ending that war is parallel to resolving the Middle East issue.

SAWT AL-SHA'B: Six years have passed since the signing of the Camp David accords. How do you view them and what are the prospects for a peaceful solution?

Khalid: Camp David is over and done with; it is a dead solution. It is now between Egypt and Israel. The Camp David method did not grow to include other Arab states. Jordan, which seeks a peaceful solution, rejects Camp David and adheres to an international conference.

We are not against any political solution that would bring about peace, using all the available cards. Camp David failed because it employed only the methods of negotiations, arguments, and persuasion. Naturally, if the enemy does not realize the danger of a failure in the negotiations and the possibility that you might resort to other actions, it will ultimately wrest concessions from you. This was the end of Camp David: Great concessions only on Egypt's part and the restoration of a demilitarized Sinai minus Tabah.

EGYPT

PETROLEUM MINISTER AFFIRMS INTENSIFIED DRILLING PLANS

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 13 Jan 86 p 2

[Text]

THE Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Mr. Abdul Hadi Kandil, yesterday affirmed that oil drilling and prospecting operations will be intensified this year, especially in the Western Desert and for the first time in deep waters of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Initial agreements to this effect were signed with the US company AMOCO and the French company "TOTAL", he said.

He stated that there will be no increase in the production of crude oil from the currently operated fields, as the Ministry's policy is directed mainly to increasing the volume of reserves which at present amount to 3,000 million barrels.

"We are keen to have a fixed volume of oil reserves", said Minister Kandil. "Accordingly," he added, "Increasing production will never be the way to compensate for the severe drop in oil prices in world markets, which affects Egypt's foreign currency." revenue. The Minister further pointed out that this year's production will reach 300 million barrels, and will meet requirements for local consumption.

Efforts are now being exerted to attract specialised international companies in the field of oil prospecting to work in Egypt, said Mr. Kandil. Attention is also directed to encouraging companies searching for natural gas to

meet the increasing needs, especially as the volume of consumption has risen from 44 million cubic metres in 1975 to 5 million cubic metres in 1985, he said.

A national unified network connecting natural gas fields with factories and power stations is currently being established, together with a control centre, to transport natural gas to meet the requirements of one million subscribers, 19 industrial companies and 10 giant power stations, said Mr. Kandil.

Concluding, Mr. Kandil said that the petroleum sector has succeeded in reaching targets set by the five-year plan for 1985, and new petroleum products were introduced for the first time." GSS

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CSO: 4500/67

security officers; and the penalties for the use of horns by bus and taxi drivers should be double that of the fines assessed for an individual's offence, as these drivers are more prone to use the horns on their vehicles unnecessarily.

In connection with the campaign and its effect upon weddings, parties, funerals, and similar sources of noise, these activities should be confined to specific areas and specific periods of time. In the event these time and place requirements are not met, security officers should be notified to speak with a representative of the offending situation and advise him to either reduce the noise to an acceptable level or to draw the function to a close.

The campaign should deal with factories in the following manner. Each factory should be contacted by a representative of the Office of the Security Director, assigned to this campaign. A decibel level as determined by the Office of the Security Director will be suggested to the factory. Each factory will have a period of 90 days within which to reduce its noise to the prescribed level. If, after the said period the factory exceeds that noise level, it will be assessed a daily fine, as determined by the Office of the Security Director. Such fine will continue to be assessed for a period of 30 days. If by that time, the reduced noise level has not yet been reached, the factory will be closed for all business, except for using whatever measures necessary to reduce its noise level as requested by the Office of the Security Director.

Implementation of the foregoing items will require diligence on the part of the campaign, patience on the part of individuals, and resourcefulness on the part of factory owners in order to determine the most economical, efficient methods to reduce its noise levels. With the cooperation of all concerned, Cairo will become a tranquil city for the enjoyment of all.

/13104

CSO: 4500/67

EGYPT

NDP WORKS OUT LAND RECLAMATION BILL

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 20 Jan 86 p 2

[Text] The National Democratic Party (NDP) has worked out a unified bill for state owned barren and reclaimed land, to overcome difficulties facing citizens as regards the purchase of such parcels of land. Deputy Premier and NDP Secretary-General, Dr. Yousel Wali, said that the new bill aims to allocate a special body to take the necessary measure to selling land, whereas at present several bodies are concerned with this task. He affirmed that the new law will provide many facilities in land reclamation operations.

Meanwhile the Chairman of the NDP Committee for Agriculture and Irrigation, Mr. Ahmed Abdul Akhar said that the body to be concerned with selling the land will be called the Agency for State Property. It will be affiliated to the Ministry of Agriculture and will be mainly concerned with supervising barren, and reclaimed land, their management and selling operations. The bill allocates 200 feddan for the individual 300 for the family and 10 feddans for the Cooperative Society.

The bill gives priority in owning desert and reclaimed land to graduates of faculties, institutes and schools of agriculture, demobilised soldiers, families of the war dead and small farmers. The same priority is also given to public sector employees on leaving service and those working in agriculture cooperatives.

In order to guarantee seriousness in utilising the land, the bill obliges citizens to cultivate the land within five years from the date of the provision of water. In case of non-adherence to this term the contract is considered null and void.

The draft law provides for establishing a fund for collecting amounts raised from the utilisation of desert and reclaimed land to be directed to land-reclamation projects. At the same time the state will provide loans to owners of this land.

The draft law stipulates the right to sell houses and establishments set up by the government in desert and reclaimed areas, to the people.

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Thus the socialist solution inevitably imposed itself as a way to social and economic progress.

What is this socialist solution? Rather, what is socialism? Is it heresy, as some say? Is it a philosophic imperative? Is it equality in poverty and starvation?

'Abd-al-Nasir said, "In the final analysis, socialism is a happy home for every family, in which those family members, male or female, who are capable or prepared to work will do so. It is a home receptive to health, education and culture, sheltered from surprises by social security, interacting with other happy homes, and sharing with them a general concern for the affairs of their homeland, their nation and the world in which they live."

Of course, socialism cannot be achieved through good intentions, and the happy home can never be built by prayers and faith alone. The wealth must be redistributed between the small percentage which earns half the society's income and the 95 percent which earns the remaining half. Naturally, this small percentage will not give up its privileges easily, and therefore the July Revolution had to choose between joining up with the one-half of one percent or with the 95 percent of the popular masses. Which would it side with? The feudalists did not concede the need to redistribute the wealth, and some of them rose up in arms against the revolution. Soldier revolutionaries can accept everything except the act of bearing arms against them; in fact, proponents of change generally accept everything but that. At the time, they could find no way out of bearing arms, since how could the feudalist justify his and his family's bearing arms while refusing to accept the same from others?! This small point was the basis for the excesses for which the July Revolution has been denounced.

Regardless of this or that denunciation, the July Revolution was not immune from mistakes. Of course excesses occurred; of course injustices took place. This is not to indict the July Revolution, but to indict those who took up arms against it, opposed it, and tried to abort it--something which later overtook those who launched the Tripartite Aggression and subsequently the June 1967 war.

During the course of the July Revolution there were many achievements which cannot be denied, neither by the enemies of the July Revolution and those who ambushed its achievements nor by those who denounced and opposed it. As for the masses, they voiced their support, commitment and adherence to the July Revolution and its leaders on 9 and 10 July 1967, and also when they bade farewell to their leader upon his death in September 1970. It is these same masses, and the new generations thereof, who today put up pictures of Abd-al-Nasir everywhere, repeat his name, and pray over his body laid in his grave on Caliph Ma'mun Street. These masses themselves are the true balance-sheet of the Nasserite movement. They will never forget a single word of the National Action Charter, the March 1968 statement, or the words of 'Abd-al-Nasir. These same masses are ardently approaching the point of merging into an affirmative Nasserite movement in the society, in the future, and in the constant

scoop, the scythe, and dairy and meat animals are still the basis of rural work, with rare exceptions. More specifically, no more than 20 percent of rural farmlands have been mechanized; in other words, more than 4 million feddans of farmland are being cultivated by primitive, backward techniques.

Is today's worker the worker for whose sake the various labor and social insurance laws were passed?

In today's society there is a new class or group which is even poorer and more miserable than the working class, the peasant class, or the migrant workers: the employees. Was the employee of 1952 (the year of the revolution) the same as now?

Numerous examples lead us to propose the idea of alliance in its old sense. Today an alliance must be forged among groups and classes whose basic interests do not conflict.

What we, the new Nasserists, are saying is that today we are living in the final years of the twentieth century, at a time when laser beams can shoot down a satellite floating in space. In 1952 there were no such satellites; there was only one moon. In 1986 there are hundreds of satellites in space, while the single, solitary moon has been revealed as a ball of rock which is being studied for the possibility of life on it.

In 1952, the flags of France and England waved over the capitals of many Middle East countries, whereas now there is not a single foreign flag in the region except for the Israeli flag. All the flags are national flags.

Therefore, our outlook differs from that of the old Nasserites.

We hold that social change cannot be achieved through armed revolution--that change must be brought about democratically. In assessing the July Revolution, we claim that its disregard for the democratic stage is what brought down all these negative aspects upon it. For this reason, we concentrate on democracy.

The new Nasserism speaks of democracy in building the party and the society, while it might be said that traditional Nasserism follows the methods of election and appointment.

We do not trust a leadership we have not chosen; we trust the masses to choose it through direct, free elections.

We denounce appointment, and we are suspicious of it in popular agencies and state legislative organizations.

The new Nasserism also does not believe in tutelage. There are no regents in the new Nasserism, not even from the family of the glorious leader, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. Rajiv Gandhi did not become the leader of India because he was the son of Indira Gandhi, but because he was a son of India's Congress Party. He grew up in the party, experienced its problems, and helped build it. He did not come down to the masses from above, but came up from their ranks. For this reason, we consider party work a basic mainstay, and a passport to the various leadership positions.

EGYPT

BRIEFS

BEDOUIN SETTLEMENTS--Aid worth 7,700,000 dollars in the form of fodstuff will be offered for the sake of settling the bedouin of Sinai, according to an agreement signed yesterday by Egypt and the World Food Programme. The agreement, which is valid for four years, will cover 3,500 families. They will be encouraged to establish productive projects such as fodder production and the cultivation of pastures in an area of 7,000 feddans between Arish and Rafah. By virtue of the agreement, agricultural units depending on the cultivation of olives and citrus fruits will be established. [Text] [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 13 Jan 86 p 3] /13104

CSO: 4500/67

TUNISIA

MZALI ON DEMOCRACY, RELATIONS WITH U.S.

PM241201 Paris LIBERATION in French 20 Jan 86 p 29

[Interview with Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Bernard Cohen in Tunis--date not given]

[Excerpts] LIBERATION: Now, 30 years after independence, it seems that all the pillars of Tunisian society are crumbling: The universities are paralyzed, the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] is in chaos, and the law on the status of women drawn up by Habib Bourguiba is opposed by young people influenced by Islamic Fundamentalists....

Mohamed Mzali: It is natural for the development of a free and independent society to produce problems and conflicts; the same happens in a family. But this is not a threat to this country's stability or cultural choices. In the universities the fashion for strikes has not yet disappeared as it has in France and the United States, but it will disappear. Moreover the "code on the status of the individual" [which has conferred certain freedoms on women since 1956--LIBERATION editor's note] has not been questioned even by those representatives of a particular religious movement with whom I have spoken.

We are working to find jobs for young people, particularly young university students because, thanks to our achievements, we now have young lawyers, doctors, engineers, and possibly even too many of them. Education must be adapted to the economy's needs. The economy is facing real problems: When our raw materials are sold at lower and lower prices and the goods imported from the rich countries are increasingly costly, how can we extricate ourselves from this situation? Oil is falling in quantity and prices, our citrus fruits, wines, and textiles are faced with protectionist trends in the Common Market.... The rich countries are growing richer and the poor countries are becoming indebted. This is the problem.

LIBERATION: For 6 years now you have been personally involved in "democratizing" public life. However, your bill on political parties is now rejected by the whole opposition. So how can next November's parliamentary elections be held in the right conditions?

Mohamed Mzali: My aim is to reconcile the need for development and labor discipline with the need for freedom, and this is not always easy. It requires what Montesquieu called "virtue" from the citizens. It takes several forces to make a democracy just as it takes two to make a marriage.

TUNISIA

SICAT COOPERATES WITH PLAN FOR DECENTRALIZED UNIVERSITY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 6 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] SICAT 85 [International Automobile Components Show of Tunisia], which is ending today, deserves credit for stating problems clearly and precisely without indulging in exaggerations and overblown cliches. Even at the risk of creating some dismay, everyone used clear statements and often spoke the naked truth. Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of higher education and scientific research, told the seminar on "the University and Industrialization," held yesterday at the Palace of Congress in conjunction with SICAT, that "in developing countries the organization of research must clearly pursue the goal of efficiency. Hesitation, a poor division of authority among the various parties, the scattering of human and financial resources, and the absence of decision-making centers would eventually produce--it it has not already happened--a considerable loss of time." Does this mean that we have reached an impasse? Only for people imbued with "a hopeless spirit of fatalism," said Mr Ben Dhia. The Tunisian university system must be changed, both structurally and organizationally. The goal is to make the university a true agent for development designed to play a dual role: to prepare for the new technological generation, and to promote the development of national actions focussed on solving the problems of the nation's economic and industrial growth.

What forms will the university reform take to meet these multiple challenges?

The Business Community Will Finance the University System

The plan advocated and developed by the minister of higher education and scientific research to better integrate the university with its environment, acting particularly through research, will involve business. Business will participate in university administration in several different ways. The business community will help to finance the university system, will take part in its administration, and will work out instructional programs in cooperation with the university. The dual role of financing and administration will be handled on a regional basis, especially as the Sixth Plan's sector commission recommended the establishment of six university regions, each including

TUNISIA

COOPERATION WITH SENEGAL IN EXHAUST PIPE PROJECT

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 9 Dec 85 p 23

[Text] A young Tunisian industrial entrepreneur in the automobile components field has just made a name for himself both in exports and in south-south cooperation.

Mr Ezzeddine Karoui, the head of SIMA-Tunisia, a Tunisian firm in Medjez El Bab which makes automotive exhaust pipes, has signed an agreement with Senegalese partners for the joint establishment of an exhaust pipe assembly plant in Senegal. The Tunisians will hold a 49 percent share in the plant, with the Senegalese partners holding 51 percent. Moreover, the agreement calls for the assembly of exhaust systems using parts provided by Tunisia. Here we should mention that SIMA-Tunisia provides 100 percent integration of these systems. The plant is to be located in the industrial area of Thies, about 70 kilometers from Dakar.

Through their colleague, Tunisian businessmen have just proved that they can be daring, and that they have sufficient boldness to reach out to win new markets. Bilateral intergovernmental agreements, particularly with the African nations, provide an ideal setting for this type of undertaking.

This shows that internal southern hemisphere cooperation is not an idle fancy, and that people simply need to take some trouble and demonstrate their imagination, courage, and determination in order to carry out the wishes of all the developing nations--to set up a true flow of exchanges on all levels.

One step has now been taken: now it is up to everyone with the means and the ambition to continue such efforts. We think Tunisia has many such people.

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CSO: 4519/44

IRAQ

AHVAZ LIBERATION FRONT OFFICIAL DENOUNCES KHOMEYNI REGIME

Baghdad AL-YARMUK in Arabic 25 Aug 85 p 3

[Interview with Husayn Madi Hasan, secretary general of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz, by 'Abd-al-Husayn 'Abd-al-Razzaq; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] AL-YARMUK held an interview with Husayn Madi Hasan, secretary general of the front, in which he said:

The front burst out as a result of the struggle of the people of Ahvaz ever since the feet of the Persian occupiers first trod the soil of Ahvaz. The front is regarded as the lawful representative of the people of Ahvaz following the unification of all the revolutionary cells.

The front has basically relied on building the individual and preparing him for the viciousness of the assault to which the people of Ahvaz are exposed.

Since the founding, the front's fighters have penetrated numerous operations that the enemy tried to carry out in our land of Ahvaz. This happened after the Khomeyni regime refused to recognize our national rights. We had hoped to obtain these rights, but Khomeyni began to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor the Shah.

[Question] Are there other fronts or cells operating along with the front?

[Answer] As we have said, the front is the lawful representative of our people in Ahvaz. If there were other movements, which actually do not exist, they would lead to the fragmentation of the revolution's forces and thus strengthen the enemy.

The proliferation of fighting cells is not to the advantage of the revolution since the result is only to serve the enemy. Furthermore, we are not involved in a class struggle, but a national one. We are not fighting to overthrow a regime, but to liberate the land and achieve our sovereignty over it.

We are an Arab people that has its own Arab identity and is an extension of the Arab people. If we study Ahvaz from the geographical point of view we see that Ahvaz constitutes a natural continuation of the plains of Iraq.

All this is happening while the enemy is launching large-scale information campaigns to get the world to believe that this land is an Iranian one.

[Question] To what extent are the Arab countries cooperating with you?

[Answer] The Arab position toward us has not yet crystallized in a clear fashion. This is true despite our continued attempts to get our brethren in Arabism to espouse the cause of Ahvaz as one of the vital causes of the Arabs. The only Arab country that is supporting us is Iraq, which has supplied us with everything we need in our revolt against the enemy.

[Question] It has been said in the past that some of the people of Ahvaz opposed the Iraqi Army at the beginning of the war. How much truth is there in these rumors?

[Answer] We should not overlook an important matter when we reply to this question. It is that the people of Ahvaz in present circumstances are subject to the provisions of Iranian law and consequently are obliged to perform military service in the ranks of the Iranian forces. It maybe that some Ahvazis have taken part in fighting on the side of the Iranians. However, they have been few in number, so we cannot establish the fact that the people of Ahvaz fought against the Iraqi forces, which never happened [sentence as published]. There is another matter also, which is that some of those whom Iraq deported to Iran because of their Persian antecedents took part in the fighting against the Iraqi forces. They were speaking Arabic because they had a command of that language. This caused some people to imagine that the people of Ahvaz fought against the Iraqi forces.

I should like to mention here that many of the people of Ahvaz determined not to join the Iranian forces when the war broke out.

[Question] How does the Khomeyni regime treat the Arab clergy?

[Answer] The Khomeyni regime did not treat the Arab clergy any better than the people of Ahvaz in general. The clergy may have been treated worse, for they were subject to strict surveillance and were forbidden to express their opinions about anything that happened.

In fact, this matter is an example of the Khomeyni regime's misconduct and arbitrariness, and of its policy in Ahvaz. This regime has followed a course of impoverishing and starving the people of Ahvaz at a time when Iran's exports of oil produced in the Ahvaz region constitute 85 percent of all of Iran's exports of oil.

Khomeyni has followed an arbitrary policy in the field of education. He has forbidden the Arabs to enroll in institutes and colleges unless they have cooperated with the regime.

ISRAEL

INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR TERRITORIES

Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 25 Dec 85 pp 11-14, 48

[Interview with Colonel Dr Efrayim Sneh, head of the civil administration in Judaea and Samaria, by Yosef Argaman: "Disillusionment, Yes; Acceptance, No"; date and place not specified]

[Text] At the completion of half a year as head of the civil administration in Judaea and Samaria, Col Dr Efrayim Sneh says that the residents of the area are becoming disillusioned with terror. He believes that there is a feeling of exhaustion among them and anticipation of a political settlement in the region. This is the first interview with the younger Sneh, 41 years old, the son of Dr Moshe Sneh and a physician in his own right, formerly commander of the medical force at Entebbe, commander of an operational unit, and commander of the South Lebanon region. His specialty, by the way, is in internal medicine and allergies.

[Question] Colonel Sneh, a week ago I heard an interesting definition relating to the composition of Israeli forces operating in Judaea and Samaria: "The good, the bad, and the ugly". The good is the civil administration, the bad is the army, and the ugly is all other security bodies that operate here. Going beyond the superficialities, do you agree that you, the administration, play the part of the good guys, as per the definition?

[Answer] No. I believe that the security systems here complement one another. That is: the civil administration, the BATASH, and the security branches. Each body plays its part in the overall scheme of things. It is true that we also are involved in providing services and in development, and we could thus be considered "good"; but we are also a system of enforcement, a system of restraint. We are an administration from every point of view--the positive and, to a certain extent, the negative. Therefore that definition is a bit simplistic. I would agree that our main task in the civil administration is assuring the regular services, developing the infrastructure, and raising the standard of living.

[Question] How would you summarize your first 5 months in this job?

[Answer] First of all, they were 5 start-up months. I learned the area.

[Question] Does not the fact that there are a great many highly educated young people here, graduates of six universities, who cannot find jobs, create a kind of intellectual-nationalist pressure cooker? What importance does the civil administration attach to that fact?

[Answer] The academic unemployment is certainly one of the socio-economic problems that cause unrest. But I would not say that it is one of the main reasons for the increase in attacks. If you look at who the attackers are, you find that they do not include many unemployed academics. If, for example, you take the infamous Surif cell, you will see that most of them have a criminal background and are very far from academia.

[Question] Nevertheless, from the point of view of the civil administration--and not, I would stress, from the field security point of view--how do you explain the recent wave of attacks, murders in cold blood, shots at automobiles? Is this wave of attacks not the result of some weakness of the civil administration that has not managed to solve the socio-economic problems of Judaea and Samaria?

[Answer] I do not think that the recent wave of attacks is because the socio-economic problems were not solved. That is not the reason. It is the result of nationalist feelings and not of some feeling of social deprivation. The reasons are political.

[Question] Did this new wave surprise those of you in the civil administration? I ask that because there is a commonly accepted saying--and not just among the sworn optimists--that goes: Come let us live together with the Arabs, they will get to know us, we will get to know them and the result will be that we will learn to live together. And here it turns out that the more we live together and the years go by, the hatred only increases. There is already a new generation of stone throwers and little terrorists that were only 2 or 3 years old or were not even born when this territory was captured. Has this saying about living together thus been proven false?

[Answer] Your thesis is very very imprecise. It is based on a simplistic view of relationships and processes involved in the area of contact between the Palestinian population and the Israeli population. I will try to show you how many levels there are to that complex system of relationships. The public that lives here in the territory--and I am talking about 800,000-900,000 Arabs--has, over the course of the years, gotten to know both the State of Israel and Israeli society. That acquaintance has occasioned within it very significant changes.

[Question] Such as?

[Answer] One of them is that from close-hand knowledge of the State of Israeli, most of them have come to recognize that Israel is a fait accompli, and they must reconcile themselves to living with her and alongside her. This recognition finds expression in positions expressed by large and important sections of the public in Judaea and Samaria. That is the positive aspect of this continuing association.

not improved over all these years--don't you see this in retrospect as a mistake on the part of your predecessors or of the Israeli government?

[Answer] Those are things that are hard to do and cannot be done one-sidedly. In fact the refugee camps were not eliminated in any state in the Middle East. When we were in Lebanon we saw Rashadiyah and Burj Shimali, Ayn Hilwah and Miyah wa Miyah, which were established as refugee camps. But there are similar ones in Jordan and Syria.

[Question] They have a political interest in preserving the camps, and we have a political interest in doing away with them.

[Answer] Correct, but one of the factors that incited the population to oppose the initial attempts at reconstruction was precisely the PLO, because it is interested in maintaining the status quo and the refugee camps. We must remember that these camps are run by UNRWA, an international body. I am not sure that in the future we will not take steps to raise the living standard of the inhabitants of the camps.

[Question] Do you have some kind of plan in that regard? More concretely: What did you do last year to improve conditions in the refugee camps?

[Answer] Last year a number of steps were taken. They are not yet big ones, but the steps in the local arena brought about a certain improvement in the standard of living. We are talking about an increase in the number of telephones, improvements in the sewer system, improvements that we are about to make in a number of places, etc. In Judaea and Samaria today there are certainly a number of important beginnings in this area for the future.

Support On the Road to Negotiation

[Question] Is the activity here somewhat more intensive than in the past?

[Answer] I think so.

[Question] What about the future and what additional plans are there for improvement?

[Answer] We are certainly planning additional activities in the refugee camps. At the moment I do not want to elaborate.

[Question] Let us go back to that group of 10 percent who support the rejectionist organizations; does the government attach special importance to that group?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Let us go back to the first question. Do you think there is a certain weariness in opposition to the Israeli conquest? You spoke earlier of a feeling of being reconciled, that people are reconciling themselves with the fact that we will stay here. Is there really any weariness?

[Answer] Let us be precise. We allowed the return of the Arab mayor of Shekhem.

[Question] From your point of view what does the appointment of an Arab mayor in Shekhem symbolize?

[Answer] The policy to permit the local inhabitants to go back to administering their own towns, where those administrations ceased for one reason or another, is not a new policy. The significance is that we did it in Shekhem, the largest city on the West Bank.

[Question] Do you expect any other appointments?

[Answer] I cannot talk about that at the moment.

[Question] What was it that made you choose Shekhem in particular?

[Answer] There was an appeal from the Shekhem municipal chamber of commerce headed by al-Masri. We examined the proposal and decided that it was possible and desirable.

Expectation of a Political Process

[Question] Does the fact that certain influential circles among the population have voiced the opinions discussed earlier have any connection with the appointment of an Arab mayor in Shekhem?

[Answer] I would say that the particular atmosphere that holds sway in the area had an influence in that it made al-Masri's candidacy possible, and that it enjoys broad public support.

[Question] Do you hope to build a new leadership in this way for the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria?

[Answer] We are not building leadership. Leadership is hard to build artificially from the outside.

[Question] If I were to ask you to define the political situation in Judaea and Samaria today, would you define it as being on hold on all sides?

[Answer] I would say that the population is in a hold situation.

[Question] What is the population waiting for? Are there clear desires that they express in their conversations?

[Answer] The local population is waiting for a turn to the political process.

[Question] What is the main effort of the civil administration today?

[Answer] We are busy setting up public services and development and, among other things, raising the standard of living; that is, the well-known general

Judaea and Samaria because of those dates. This November saw the lowest number of outbreaks of disorder in several years. By way of comparison, there were only a third of the incidents that took place in 1983 and half the number that took place last year. Thus, from that point of view, it was a particularly quiet month this year.

[Question] Do you attribute that to weariness or to your own initiatives?

[Answer] To weariness, but not only to that. In very large measure it must be attributed to the whole gamut of activities conducted in the field by the various security elements: field security, the civil administration, and the other security branches.

[Question] What part did the civil administration play in this?

[Answer] The activity was coordinated. Our part was in managing contacts with the heads of educational institutions and the heads of various sectors. We appealed to them and explained that disorder could snowball into confrontations and violence and, in the final analysis, it does not serve the interest of the population.

[Question] Don't they understand that by themselves?

[Answer] They do, but it is also important to explain it.

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CSO: 4423/72

Hebron's constructed area has grown threefold, spreading from the urban to the adjacent rural area. This building spree was also assisted by Palestinian-Jordanian funds.

The Jewish Committee for Renewing Jewish Settlement in Hebron has published a master plan in which it demands to seize an area of approximately 70 dunam within the city of Hebron (area which in the past belonged to Jews), in the locations of the wholesale market, the bus station, and Khirbat al-Rumaythah. According to the plan approximately 500 apartments will be built there, housing about 3,000 people.

At a second stage it is suggested to connect the three Jewish sites in the heart of the commercial section (Bet Hadassah, Bet Romano, Avraham Avinu) by means of purchase or expropriation, and populating a connected Jewish quarter which would be similar in size of the Jewish quarter in Jerusalem. In the long term it is proposed to connect this area with the Makhpelah Cave through Hebron's casbah.

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CSO: 4400/87

grew up in a religious family, or at least had a religious family as a neighbor. Now you have entire villages without one religious household. Without religion we will lose our national character. The Jews, who spent thousands of years in the Diaspora, remained a nation because their religion preserved them against assimilation. And today there is a Jewish nation, living in its country, thanks to religion. The importance of religion is all the greater for a people like the Druze, who do not have a state of their own, and all that they share is their special and distinctive religion.

"Take young Druze growing up in a secular home; you cannot, in fact, distinguish between them and between secular Jewish young men. The distinctive character of the Druze comes from their religious tradition. I am convinced that each proud Druze, who is concerned about the continuity of his people, must observe his religion and traditions. A young man coming from a religious home is stronger. And because religion is important for the sect and for its unity, and because army life is not compatible with religious life, the young Druze should be released from military service."

Religious Prohibitions

Hasan Hirbawi, who is viewed as an important figure among the repenting young generation, and who spent long years in the IDF, is very careful in talking about the principles of the Druze religion. He stresses that the religion is opposed to any military service, not necessarily to the IDF alone, but to all armies. "All the trappings of modern life, such as baring the body and associating with women, are categorically forbidden to religious Druze men. Consequently, a Druze young man cannot serve in the military: not because he hates the IDF, but because he wants to live religiously and to observe the values of his religion. And serving in any other defense branch is equally prohibited, for the simple reason that according to one of the principles of the religion, a Druze may not sleep outside his home. And I am not even mentioning other things, involving more elaborate religious commandments, that prohibit a religious man from being in the army." Dr Fadil Mansur from Usfiya has been in the past years living according to the strictest religious prescriptions, a fact that he does not hide even in the area of his academic pursuits. Dr Mansur is even more categorical in his pronouncements: "There are two sins that a religious Druze cannot commit and still be a religious man: fornication and murder. Military service increases the possibility of falling prey to those sins."

Arye Simhoni, a staff member of the youth department of the Defense Ministry, who attended the seminar dealing with the integration of young Druze in the IDF where Dr Mansur expressed his views, stood up and emphasized that there is neither fornication nor murder in the IDF. A high-ranking IDF officer who lives in one of the traditional Druze villages vigorously rejected the assumption that one cannot preserve the Druze pride and tradition and be a military man at the same time. "For hundreds of years," the officer said, "the Druze fought in every war in the service of various masters, and often even for themselves. I never heard that they were disgraced in the eyes of the Druze tradition for having fought, on the contrary. I myself live in a traditional village, and I have never heard anyone say that I violate the modesty of the sect or its principles by being an army man."

am convinced that if the compulsory service is lifted for the Druze, and their military service becomes voluntary, the overall number of young Druze in the IDF will not drop in the least, but will even increase."

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draw up a dual account: one with the establishment, which is trying to erode the freedom of expression, and one with ourselves, with the press that deviates from the path of honest and verified reporting and at times ignores the principles of journalistic ethics that it has established within the framework of the Press Council.

In the absence of a constitution, the freedom of the press is not ensured either, but is based on general agreement on the meaning of our democratic system. On the other hand, the mandatory press law is still valid in Israel, according to which, for example, one has to have the permission of the Ministry of the Interior to bring out a newspaper. Although this law normally does not interfere with the appearance of new newspapers, in itself the prerogative given to the minister of the interior to "issue permits" for newspapers is in contradiction with the principle of freedom of expression.

Moreover, according to the same mandatory law, the minister of the interior has the right to close down a newspaper administratively under the claim, for example, that its writings may cause panic or unrest among the public, or disrupt public peace--foggy definitions formulated at the time by the mandate authorities for the purposes of their struggle against the Land of Israel press, which was fighting them at the side of the Jewish settlement. So far there has been only one attempt to enact those laws. It occurred at the beginning of the 1950's, and the laws were invoked against MAKI's newspaper KOL HA'AM, which was closed down for having published an item about Israeli troops being sent to Korea to help the U.S. Army. After a very long legal trial, that regulation was annulled. Since then the law has not been applied, but the very fact of its formal validity constitutes a blot on a democratic system, all the more so since this law may be wielded against Palestinian newspapers, which are closed down by decree of the military authorities. But I will come back to this particular issue.

The Sympathy of the Legal System

Indeed, additional restrictive laws have accumulated through the years, such as the libel law and the law of individual privacy. The press fought hard struggles against those two laws, but in the event we may as well admit that the devil is not all that black, and there is a justification for permitting the individual injured by some press statement to defend himself in front of a legal court. As for the libel law, at the same lecture by the legal adviser we heard that the legal system itself is more than sympathetic to preserving the freedom of the press. Thus, for example, according to the law, the person suing for libel must prove not only the falsehood of the statement, but also malicious intent on the part of the publication, and Israeli judges--according to the legal adviser--have expanded the meaning of the term "malicious intent" beyond what is customary. For example, in U.S. courts, malicious intent means that the publisher purposely intended to injure the defendant (personal grudge, settling personal accounts, etc.).

Out of the three draft bills recently under discussion, two have actually been scrapped because of the ministers who initiated them. Minister Shahal claims "nothing of the kind," he never intended to propose a law on press licensing, but on bolstering the Press Council. At the same time, the minister of police,

An additional and very wide spread example of ethical violations are items that cast aspersions on an individual without the reporter having bothered to find out the reaction of the individual to the claims or suspicions he is about to cite against him. This is one of the ironclad rules of journalistic ethics, but many journalists ignore or circumvent it, sometimes under the excuse of "time pressure," and sometimes because they fear the reaction may "kill the scoop." No, I do not assume that there are such journalists, I know it from experience, and I have even heard such an admission from a reporter, on the occasion of the examination of a complaint brought against him to a Press Council committee: "I had a great headline," he claimed, "and I did not want the individual involved to deny everything and leave me without the scoop."

Did Minister Dekel Speak, or Did He Drink Coffee?

Another issue concerns revealing the source of information. Reporters have many reasons not to identify their informants, particularly when it is a matter of revealed secrets. To begin with, most reporters are given the information on the condition that the name of the one doing the leaking not be cited. Secondly, the reporter is not interested in burning his connections for the future. In Britain, for example, journalists have gone to jail rather than reveal their sources. In our country, there is no such danger (yet?), and protecting one's sources is one of the domains of the journalistic profession. But, here, too, there is a reservation, and that is that the information must be genuine; secondly, there must not be arbitrary use of generalizations such as "a senior government source," whereby the phrase is used to hide another, perhaps less relevant, source for the information.

And indeed, this claim was raised this week by the minister of police and by the police general commander at a meeting with newspaper editors. They cited many examples of items based on "senior police sources," without any real proof. One such prominent example was an item printed in one of the newspapers on the details of the first investigation of Deputy Defense Minister Dekel; the item featured many details on a long series of questions put to Dekel--a truly suspenseful story. Except that what really occurred at that first meeting between the police and Dekel was that he was asked one question: "Are you prepared to make a statement?" to which he laconically replied: "I have to consult with my lawyers." After which the two sides had coffee. So where did the exciting story of all those questions and answers come from, and why was the "leak" attributed to "a senior police source"?

It is not the purpose of this criticism to deprive the press of the right to investigate, to seek information, and to present what the establishment describes as "leaks." The term itself is misleading, because the government itself is the which who turns off the tap on information the publication of which is legitimate and even vital for the fulfillment of the role of the press as the watchdog of democracy. In our country everything becomes a "deep secret," especially when it covers a shortcoming, failure, or criminal act. It is not the leak that should be blamed, but the taps, the "security taps" of the establishment. Had it not been for leaks, the Watergate affairs would not have come to light in the United States, nor the Yadlin affair in our country.

against this violation of the freedom of the press, and why has no press body attempted to investigate the shameful situation in which an East Jerusalem paper cannot print an article or information that has already appeared in Israeli newspapers?

As we see, the accounts are dual. Attempts to erode the freedom of the press will continue, and we are still faced with the draft bill to ban names of suspects. In point of fact, this law will affect not only the right of the press to report, but equally the principle of open investigation. The law may also hurt the suspects and detainees themselves, as the police may then be able to hold people arbitrarily. Secret investigation implies the rule of secrecy and uncontrolled government. This bill can be blocked on the basis of the regulations of the Press Council, which also restrict the publication of suspects' names until they have been officially charged, except for investigations of public interest.

Of course, politicians and public figures must take into account the "professional risks" involved in their positions, which leave them open to criticism. It is not conceivable, for example, that the fact of an investigation against a government minister should be concealed from the public under the pretext that "he has not been charged yet."

On the other hand, the press, too, must take stock of its deviations from the rules of journalistic ethics. The more it indulges in carelessness, unreliable reporting, and other sins against journalistic ethics, the easier will be the work of those plotting against it.

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with it. The answer is: through the commanding officers. Only the commanding officers can dispel the dejection and the "they say" atmosphere.

[Question] A considerable number of high school seniors constitute the elite of the country. They do not cause much worry, but what about the other strata, whose sons serve as garage mechanics or shekem [canteen] personnel, whose immediate superiors are at the same intellectual level as they are, and who have not been reached by education in either high school or the army.

[Answer] If you liken the society to some sort of imaginary pole, 5 percent of it, at the upper end, will be white, and 5 percent, at the other end, will be black, but what will be the color of the remaining 90 percent of the pole? Some say gray, but I claim that it will actually not have any color. The pole will be transparent. It will acquire color, according to the principle of optical fiber, when you connect to it the white from above and the black from below. Most people are torn between the two colors, but if you have a positive leadership above, there are good chances that the white will prevail upon the black. If we develop leadership in the IDF, we will find that the phenomenon of "idlers," or lack of motivation, will disappear. But if we weaken those at the top, the negative elements will gain strength and the black will prevail. Do not think of the colors in terms of skin color. If we take the State of Israel and represent it as a triangle, at one end we will find the Israeli average, at the second end the small state, and if at the third end we have 2,000 excellent people, who thoroughly understand their mission and exert their influence, then it will be possible to change the atmosphere in the IDF and throughout the country.

[Question] What prompted a man like you, who so far has held frontline positions, to become chief education commander?

[Answer] I want to change the atmosphere in the army, and through the army, in the entire country. The IDF radiates a special aura on Israeli society. This is a challenge!

[Question] Did the Lebanon war have an effect on the army? It was the first war we fought without national consensus.

[Answer] The question is whether you can fight a war on which there is no agreement. In my opinion, yes. We must explain to the commanding officers that each one of them has a right to his own views, but as long as the decision is legal, the army must go out and fight. Anyone who does not think he can take it can resign. I think that Ely Geva's gesture was legitimate. I do not want in the army officers who do not believe in what they are doing. The IDF's greatness resides in the fact that its officers can go home any time. The government decides, and our job is to fight. As soon as I explained this to the troops, they grasped the meaning of democracy. An army must be able to fight without consensus, too.

Playing with LEGO Until Age 3

[Question] You are probably right as far as the battle units are concerned, but what about the deprived strata? There, commanding officers lack the

convinced that this is a very important project. Imagine that each base takes a surrounding area with a 10 km radius and influences the society around it. We can cover all of Israel in this manner!

[Question] What is your stand on religious revivalism in the IDF?

[Answer] According to my philosophy, revivalism is not good for the IDF, because it takes a man out of the realm of Zionist action. If the repentant one continues to fly, to sit in a tank, and to fight, all right. But the ones who do so are few, while the majority leave to go to yeshiva [religious school].

[Question] The HABAD have a "tank" and they visit bases and try to influence people. Will you ban this tank?

[Answer] I do not think that the HABAD people have any serious weight. I have known them for years, and they still try, unsuccessfully, to convince me to put on phylacteries. The HABAD does not represent revivalism in the negative sense. Interestingly, those who go back to religion are precisely the intelligent and the doubting in a group. They seek answers to distressing questions, and religion has an answer to everything. The more intelligent a person, the farther he will go in his repentance. That I find painful.

[Question] Have there been attempts to bar their access to IDF camps?

[Answer] I am not sure that that would help. The army must do everything possible to prevent people from being wrested out of the Zionist circle, on which everything depends.

One Hundred Days Later

One hundred days later I came to the house of Nehemya Dagan and found an angrier and more bitter chief education commander. At the time of our previous discussion, 3 months earlier, the cutting sword had not yet been poised above his head and he had believed he could effect radical changes and return the IDF to its days of glory, to the first years of the state, when soldiers lined up for theater and concert tickets, and when discussions in camp tents revolved around Agnon, "Panfilov's men," and S. Yizhar. At the time, when Habima [Theater] staged Yig'al Mossinson's "In the Wilderness of the Negev," the gallery was filled with men of the Giv'ati Brigade who had come to see the play, and who even protested loudly about historical distortions concerning the defense of the Negev, and, for many hours after the end of the play, in a bitter cold wind, heatedly argued with the actors and the public about the play and its objectives. Those are probably the innermost aspirations of Birg Gen Nehemya Dagan, chief education commander, who had now been in his post for 100 days.

One week earlier he had shut himself in his house, sharpened a dozen pencils, and begun writing the pamphlet containing his philosophy and original suggestions on how to educate the IDF in 1986, including ideology and its practical implementation. The pages are scattered throughout his house, and his head is full of new ideas. Every once in a while, his dog and Siamese cat

[Question] Do people in the IDF not understand this?

[Answer] I do not know. Judging by what they say, they understand very well, but judging by what they are willing to invest in education, I am worried, very worried. If you apply to education the same criteria that is used to assess staff work, performed by staff personnel, then education does not stand a chance, because it cannot compete with a rocket or with flight hours. Consequently, someone should look at the entire picture from above, then decide the place of education within the overall hierarchy of priorities in the IDF. The implementation of an education policy cannot be gauged by immediate results. We must decide what to insist upon and what to give up.

[Question] And if, in these "troubled times," it is decided to deprive you of the \$600,000?

[Answer] I do not want to think about it!

We Must Wave a Lot of Flags

[Question] You are putting together a pamphlet containing your educational "credo." What is the IDF going to deal with in the coming year?

[Answer] With all the topics that are currently of concern: the alternative to our life in this country and its significance; emigration; relations in the Arab sector; the relations between us and the Israeli Arabs; the relationship between the religious and secular population; the drug problem; educating the individual as a consumer of culture; Hebrew language improvement, and educating the soldier as a reader of books.

[Question] Will you restore to the IDF the Tarmil Library [Sifriyat Tarmil] which was about to close down?

[Answer] Who is talking of closing down? I am about to bolster the Pocket Books! Recently we had a discussion on this subject with Hayim Be'er, Binyamin Tamuz, Hayim Guri, Nurit Govrin, Ehud Ben-Ezer, Yisra'el Har--the editor of Pocket Books--and the publishing administrator of the Defense Ministry. You see, we do not have the time to wave one flag. In 1986 we will have to wave many flags!

[Question] Give me an example of the manifestations of "culture" that you want to restore to the IDF?

[Answer] In the area of theater, for example, the troops will see more plays, and cultural-educational activities will be conducted around them: discussions, lectures, meetings with the actors before or after the play. Take, for example, the play "Kastner." Attending such a play is an excellent opportunity to invite historians, men of culture, and actors to a base and to hear about the period and about the issues raised by the play. We can build an entire day of creative cultural activities around the play.

Another example: one of the projects featured in the pamphlet is the "Sunday Project." As is known, every Sunday, thousands of soldiers gather in the four

consciousness of the Israeli people. It is true that the times have changed, methods have changed, and the people are different, but the goals are the same, and the potential is the same.

You see, I have a concert subscription, and I try not to miss any. Once they used to let soldiers go in for free and sit on the steps or in the aisles; today that is unfortunately no longer allowed. Soldiers sitting at a concert, even in the aisles, present a wonderful picture of young people who love music and culture. That is the dream, that is what the chief-of-staff expects from me, and that is what the people of Israel deserve. Provided they let us work!

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KUWAIT

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY IN SOLVING STOCK CRISIS EXAMINED

Manama SADA AL-USBU' in Arabic 19 Nov 85 pp 12-15

[Article: "In Kuwait, Chamber Dresses al-Manakh Wounds"]

[Text] Under various political and economic systems and in all countries, both in the advanced countries and in countries striving for progress, chambers of commerce stand guard over the economic interests and are a mirror sincerely reflecting the economic reality with its faults and virtues.

Because economic wounds leave deep scars in the bodies of developing countries, they cause the tasks entrusted to the chambers of commerce in these countries to grow bigger and this saddles these chambers with greater burdens and challenges.

But few of these chambers perform their responsibilities and are aware of their role while the others snore in deep slumber.

What the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry has done is a model embodying the ideal role of the chamber of commerce which understands its role in shouldering the responsibilities of protecting the national economy.

In Kuwait, but not elsewhere, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been striving to dress the still-bleeding wounds in the national economy's body resulting from al-Manakh Market crisis.

The chamber has not concealed the fruits of its efforts from the eyes of the press because it has nothing which it is ashamed to reveal and because it has no faults it wishes to hide.

The sisterly AL-WATAN published a full report by the Bahraini Chamber of Commerce and Industry on confronting the problem of bank loans which threaten the banks and financial institutions.

We believe it is proper to point out how the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry has bravely confronted the crisis experienced by the national economy there because we believe in the similarity of the

Here, the chamber stresses that the program pointed out by the government statement cannot be practical and beneficial unless the state defines its position on all these concepts clearly.

As for the problem of bank loans, the chamber has offered from the outset a clear definition of the problem of bank loans and has outlined the dimensions of this problem.

The chamber defines this problem as being "embodied in the loans which the private and joint sectors owe the Kuwaiti banking apparatus and whose payable returns or interest have become merely payable but uncollected revenues. Moreover, part of the original value of the loans has become as good as unrecoverable while collection of the other part requires an extension of the loan period and a breakdown of the repayment into installments."

This problem is attributable to the big drop, resulting from al-Manakh Market crisis, in the value of assets consisting of real estate, lands, and shares which borrowers mortgaged to the banks as collateral for their loans--a drop which has made some of the borrowers unable to repay the full sum of the loan plus the interest payable for it.

The second reason is connected with the rapid decline in the level of most private-sector economic activities in the wake of the enormous and abnormal leap. This decline has led to a drop in the cash flow of many of the debtors, thus affecting their financial ability to repay their loans and their installments upon the date of maturation.

The third reason is the refusal of some debtors to meet their obligations despite their ability to do so!

The fourth reason is the failure of the government to take precautions, while dealing with al-Manakh crisis, against the negative consequences of this crisis on the banking apparatus in particular and on the financial sector in general.

The Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce neither exaggerated nor minimized in projecting the dimensions of the problem of bank loans. Because the indebtedness figures are of a confidential nature, the Kuwaiti Chamber has been guided by general indicators in defining the dimensions of the problem. The chamber denies that all the credits are doubtful or "unserviceable."

However, the chamber considers the distribution of credit facilities to the various sectors as reflected in the statistics an inaccurate distribution because the banks are not certain of the actual spheres in which their loans are used. Consequently, what can be deducted from this figure as doubtful loans is countered by other doubtful loans distributed over other sectors. The chamber has estimated the size of the problem at 2 billion Kuwaiti dinars.

Moreover, the banks must put aside all their profits or some of these profits for a number of years to build the reserves necessary for absorbing the dead debts and to cover their share in rescheduling the loans.

The chamber defines the responsibility of the state in the lax application of the laws and controls, thus contributing to creating a crisis and even escalating the crisis by failing to heed the advice of the Central Bank which refused to approve the establishment of the Joint-Stock Investment Company in 1981 and 1982.

By defining the general principles and the dimensions of the problem, the Kuwaiti Chamber opened the door for the entry of public money into the solution circle. But in this respect, the chamber defines the framework of this intervention which it justifies on the basis of the program submitted by the Kuwaiti government to the National Assembly.

If the government decides that public money will intervene only if there is a possibility that the situation will be turned into a general problem and only to protect the financial, economic, and social system, then the government report itself stresses that it is necessary to find the proper and effective solution to settle the problem of bank loans and to bolster the financial position of the banks and financial firms on the basis of the government's concern to strengthen the financial position of the banks and to preserve the reputation of its banking and financial institutions abroad, on the basis that settling the bank loans is a fundamental and major step within the framework of any effort to revive the economic situation in Kuwait, and on the basis that protecting the state's banking institutions and financial firms is within the higher interests and that using public money to achieve this protection is considered ultimately a gain for, not a loss to, the national economy.

Consequently, the Kuwaiti Chamber found a number of other facts that strengthen the justifications for public money intervention to deal with the crisis of the debts and to bolster the financial position of the banking apparatus. The facts are these: The public's money is not used for gain or loss but to help maintain economic institutions that are capable of survival and beneficial to the national economy.

Second, the state itself owns more than one-third of the stock of the country's banking apparatus and nearly two-thirds of the stock of the financial firms, including the investment firms.

Third, the state actually shares the responsibility for the emergence and development of the problem. Therefore, it is only fair that it take part in shouldering the costs of dealing with this problem.

The Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry did not stop at the limit of diagnosing, describing, and theorizing but went beyond to propose the measures necessary to deal with the problem experienced by the

To insure the national banking apparatus' obligations, considering that the Kuwaiti government has constantly underlined its eagerness for the soundness of the Kuwaiti banks' financial positions and to insure the depositors' rights, the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce finds it necessary, rather beneficial, that this declared policy gain a binding legal quality. The Kuwaiti Chamber, "within the framework of its efforts to serve the national economy's interest," stresses that this can be achieved by issuing a decree, or perhaps a law, stating that the State of Kuwait fully guarantees all the obligations of the Kuwaiti banks, including deposits, loans, and other credits, in terms of both the sum and the maturation date for the next 10 years at least.

The Kuwaiti Chamber asserted that such a measure eliminates altogether any fear emanating from the problem of indebtedness and any concern that may be generated by unexpected events.

To prevent an escalation of the problem of the refusal of capable debtors to meet their obligations in the hope that the authorities concerned will reduce the size of these obligations, the Kuwaiti Chamber has asked the authorities concerned to issue an announcement stating decisively that these authorities are not thinking of reducing the amount of the loans, credits, interest payable, or interest accumulating in the future. The declaration should also stress that these authorities will not be obliged to accept the integrity and honesty of the statements the debtor presents on his financial position and that any falsification in these statements will result in deterrent penalties.

These authorities should also make it clear that only those who prove that amicable settlements will help them continue their activity in an acceptable manner and repay their obligations on time and in accordance with the terms stipulated by the settlements will benefit from such settlements.

The Kuwaiti Chamber also proposed the formation of a firm to manage the mortgaged assets and to purchase the difficult loans and that government aid to this firm be confined to long-range loans on soft terms. Instead of having the state advance to the banks directly all the required aid in the form of soft-term deposits, it can advance this aid or part of it to the proposed firm in the form of long-range loans on soft terms, considering this company's shareholders, namely the banks and financial institutions, guarantors of the loans, or each bank or institution according to its share of the capital. The state, represented in the Central Bank, will have direct and constant control over the firm's activities and over the decisions of its board of directors. The state will also have a fundamental role in formulating the policies and rules in accordance with which the firm is to operate.

The Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce has a number of other steps and measures to facilitate dealing with the indebtedness problem, such as establishing the criteria compatible with the nature and dimensions of the problem and with the given facts of the Kuwaiti borrowers.

LEBANON

SECRETARY GENERAL OF ARMED FORCES ON CHRISTIAN SURVIVAL

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French 9-16 Nov 85 pp 18-20

[Interview with Georges Adwan, secretary general of the Lebanese Forces (FL), by Evelyne Massoud; date and place not given]

[Text] With a faraway look in his eye and slow and measured gestures marking his sense of synthesis and detail, Georges Adwan, secretary general of the Lebanese Forces, does not fear moments of truth, even if he sometimes derives the advantage from them by admitting errors along the way. With him, one can speak openly and without hesitation of all controversial subjects.

President of the Mountain Bureau which, after the Zouk congress held on 6 July 1985, has included Haut-Metn, Aley, Shuf, Iqlim and eastern Saida, Adwan has personally taken up the problem of displaced Christians, without whose return he deems that any inter-Lebanese entente or geographic reunification of the country would be impossible.

Despite current problems going beyond the framework of the mountains, one had to put to the secretary general a number of questions which the people are asking somewhat openly. His answers to those questions are as follows: no hegemony of any one party over another; the FL do not intend to monopolize the Christian decision; no Lebanon without its sacred values: democracy and freedom.

Negotiating the Return of 400,000 Displaced Christians

[Question] You have personally assumed responsibility for the problem of the displaced Christians. It is you who brought it to the forefront of the national scene and made it a political priority. What fate does the imminent tripartite Damascus agreement reserve for them?

[Answer] Actually, I have helped give the problem its rightful value. The cause of the Christian refugees in Haut-Metn, Shuf, Aley, Iqlim and eastern Saida risked being forgotten. And yet, their geographic and demographic impact is impressive.

[Question] How many are there?

Nevertheless, we will rely on the experience of the past to find its gaps and spare Christians of the future the massacres of which they have been the victims. Without a doubt, the experience we have lived in the mountains has been very harsh. In addition, following the example of others, it has enabled us to realize that if living together was difficult, it was almost more difficult or even impossible to live alone. I believe that the Druse are beginning to realize how great a guarantee the presence of the Christians is for them, how beneficial it can be. Insofar as they realize this, we can look to the future with some optimism.

[Question] According to what you say, can one presume that the FL have given up the idea of a Christian canton whose creation was attributed to them? Has that idea been abandoned once and for all?

[Answer] The FL have never thought about creating a Christian canton. They have never given up the idea of the return of displaced refugees to their own regions. I can tell you that the FL as an institution have never envisaged such a proposal.

[Question] In some circles, the FL are said to be responsible for the exodus of the Christians from the mountains, from Iqlim, from eastern Saida. Is it in order to make up for their mistakes that the FL are working for the return home of those Christians?

[Answer] Without a doubt, mistakes have been made and only those capable of recognizing their errors are capable of glimpsing the future and of finding suitable solutions. There are many who have tried to attribute to the FL all responsibility for the setbacks in the mountains, either for political reasons or in order to duck their responsibilities facing these displaced Christians. Objectively speaking and very simply put, I would tell you that the Christians have been forced to leave their villages because of their religious affiliation. It may be that errors have influenced the process, I do not deny it, but the main reason remains their religious affiliation. I believe that at the end of a certain amount of time, we have, along with those on the other side, enough objectivity and lucidity to admit it. Whatever the case, we must take up the cause of the displaced persons and we shall take it up until the end.

Political Accord

[Question] Are you ready to ensure the return to Christian regions of the Shiites, Muslims, in sum? Nabaa is still empty, is it not?

[Answer] When a principle of justice is set forth, it is a general rule. When we demand the return of displaced Christians to their villages, we thereby accept and with the same objectivity the return of the Druse, Shiites or Sunnites of Lebanon to our regions.

[Question] And you will guarantee their protection?

[Answer] We are completely willing to guarantee anything concerning them.

partisan, non-national bases. They have tried to resort to fancy adjectives denoting the political affiliation of refugees in order to establish distinctions, classify the villages and regions, authorizing some to return and forcing others to remain elsewhere. I believe that time has shown that such an approach is false. The problem is not posed at the political partisan level, but at the national level. There is a problem to resolve between the Christians of the mountains and the Druse and that problem will be solved on this basis and not on a partisan basis. Otherwise, it never will be.

[Question] Could the Kataeb and the FL soldier return home?

[Answer] I do not view the problem in that way. Are the members of the FL not Christians, mountain natives?

[Question] But you have to admit that it would be difficult for them to return home.

[Answer] It is not difficult when the agreement being concluded is between the PSP, the FL and Amal's people. Why should there be an agreement at the leadership level and not between the rank and file? Either the rank and file and the leadership are one and the same or they are not. I believe they are. I believe that this problem is outdated and that we must now view the problem from another angle: not on the level of the Kataeb-FL, but on the Christian and Druse level. The failure of past attempts has shown that it will not be possible to envisage this problem from another angle in the future.

As we know, the displaced persons were divided based on their partisan affiliation. They learned -- and this is to their great credit -- to overcome internal quarrels and become part of our Christian society. Today, the displaced persons are no longer grouped around their political party, but rather, around a cause: their return to their homes, their villages. We must now view the problem as such. The Zouk congress on 6 July that brought together 400 persons from all villages showed that henceforth, the problem of the mountains must be considered in an overall manner rather than from a partisan standpoint.

Realistic

[Question] If the displaced persons returned home, would they live in mixed villages or would there be Christian villages, Druse villages, and so on?

[Answer] One must be realistic and recognize that miracles have become rare nowadays. Believing that the return of the refugees will take place overnight, as if by miracle, is to ignore reality. Once the agreement in principle has been concluded, a plan and schedule will be drawn up. It is normal that Christians from purely Christian villages will return before the Christians from mixed villages. This will not exclude the return of the latter in a later phase. As long as the agreement is general, as long as it concerns all Christians, nothing would prevent the plan from being carried out in phases so that incidental problems do not affect the general agreement.

its chairman. I am part of an institution. I respect its rules and its discipline.

[Question] And yet, you can tell us whether you feel positively about it, whether that accord will truly mean the end of the fighting which everyone wants so much.

[Answer] Everyone has one desire: to have a just and lasting peace. It is up to each one of us to find in that agreement all the necessary elements ensuring its durability. I am among those people.

[Question] You speak of Christian society, of the return of persons displaced in the mountains. You negotiate; you make decisions. Actually, do the FL represent all of Christian society? Since this is a moment of truth and since you are an open person who accepts criticism and remarks, let us say that you have taken upon yourself the right to represent Christian society, neglecting other parties, particularly the Kataeb, from which you spring and with which you have come into conflict. We cannot understand what is happening. Can you enlighten us?

[Answer] We are in the process of speaking specifically about the problem of the mountains. I am speaking with you as president of the Mountain Bureau. That Bureau is not -- on this we must be clear -- an institution of the FL. It is an independent institution grouping displaced persons from the mountains without consideration as to their political affiliation. Within that Bureau, you will find people affiliated with the different parties and others who are not. They share a common cause: their return home amidst dignity.

[Question] Fine, but you are the secretary general of the FL and I address myself to you as such, for you do assume your responsibilities in that institution?

[Answer] Completely.

[Question] You are considered to be conciliating and to have built bridges between all Christians.

[Answer] It is my duty to be open and my conviction is to accept dialogue without conditions.

[Question] Then tell us if you can truly monopolize the Christian decision.

[Answer] I will answer you, although that is not part of our subject. We have neither the claim nor the desire to monopolize the Christian decision.

[Question] But you have done it.

[Answer] We have not done it. We are aware that the first thing to defend in our Christian society is the freedoms and democracy which are sacred. As long as it is our objective to free the Christian decision of all hegemony, we do not intend to free it in order to monopolize it ourselves.

LEBANON

FUEL SUBSIDIES POSE BUDGETARY PROBLEM

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French 9-16 Nov 85 pp 68-69, 92-93

[Text] While there is once again talk of a somewhat imminent normalization of the situation, the matter of the elimination of fuel subsidies has once again arisen. The last time it figured on the Cabinet agenda. One of the problems to be solved is the growing budget deficit and the fuel subsidies are considered to be one of the causes of the budget deficit.

These facts do not cover recent years. With the sharp increase in the dollar at the end of 1984 and in 1985, estimates of subsidies linked to the price of the American currency have been made as follows.

Nor is Lebanon the first country to face similar problems. At the beginning of 1977, Egypt experienced it and suffered pressure from its creditors. The increase in prices following the lifting of subsidies on basic products caused the riots of January 1977. Since that time, the Egyptian Government has had to make concessions. In fact, these subsidies still represent some 20 percent of the deficit in the country's public finances.

In August 1983, Algeria also had to take preparatory measures connected with the price increase. The operation seems to have gone smoothly. This is also true of Morocco during the same period, but it had disturbances in January 1984. Tunisia took sudden measures in November 1983, with the well-known consequences.

This does not mean that possible measures in Lebanon would produce the same effects. The Lebanese have much deeper issues of anguish and suffering.

And yet, the matter of the subsidies has direct and indirect implications for the national economy, the standard of living of social classes with limited income, the situation of public finances, the monetary situation, inflation and the high cost of living. That is why we must view it from four angles: 1) the cost of subsidies for the public treasury; 2) who profits from subsidies directly and in short-range terms; 3) who suffers from the subsidies; and 4) the economic and social consequences of a possible elimination of the subsidies.

We have tried to show the distribution of subsidies granted to the different types of fuel in the following table:

Table 4. Estimated Distribution of Fuel Subsidies 1980, 1981, 1982 (in millions of LL)

| Year | Gas for Pub. Pub. Trans. | Gas Oil Baking | Fuel oil Heating & Electricity | Fuel Oil Gas | Liquid Gas | Kerosene | Deficit Tripoli | Total |
|------|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|----------|--------------------|-------|
| 1980 | 72 | 12 | | 266 | | | 250 | 600 |
| 1981 | 75 | 50 | 123 | 220 | 12 | 22 | | 502 |
| 1982 | 75 | | 123 | 220 | 22 | 73 | | |

Source: For 1980, Ministry of Industry and Petroleum; for 1981, Letter from the 1982 Budget, pp 47-48.


We thus have an estimate of all subsidies on the order of 600 million pounds for 1980, based on the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum, and 502 million LL for 1981, according to the Ministry of Finance (Letter from 1982 Budget).

It is likely that the overall amount of these subsidies will be stabilized in 1982 with the settling of crude oil prices and the drop in the price of the dollar compared with the Lebanese pound at the time. For 1983, the drop in crude prices was largely compensated for by the increase in the dollar compared with the Lebanese pound, but the consumption of fuel had to be reduced and in different ways due to the deterioration in the political-military situation.

However, the total amounts of subsidies vary so much from year to year and from one source to another that it will be necessary to have the final figures from government budgets in due form in order to formulate a final opinion.

This increase in the deficit of the Autonomous Fuel Fund stems from several combined factors: 1) the increase in quantities of oil products consumed, as illustrated in tables 5 and 6; 2) the increase in crude prices illustrated by Graph 1; 3) the increase in volumes of crude oil imported illustrated by Graph 2; and 4) the increase in prices, which was not enough to make up for cost increases.

Graph 1. Crude Oil Prices



Graph 2. Amount of Crude Oil Imported




Table 5. Oil Products Distributed 1974-1980 (in tons)

| <u>Product</u> | <u>1974</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1980</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Gas | 546,177 | 390,867 | 480,807 | 524,217 | 591,787 |
| Medreco | 98,691 | 92,014 | 117,096 | 214,773 | 263,184 |
| Tripoli | 447,486 | 298,853 | 363,711 | 309,444 | 328,603 |
| Jet fuel | 206,187 | 110,515 | 127,339 | 115,363 | 166,110 |
| Medreco | 93,230 | 42,438 | 45,823 | 64,998 | 72,092 |
| Tripoli | 112,957 | 68,077 | 81,516 | 50,365 | 94,018 |
| Kerosene for lighting | 21,251 | 21,501 | 20,063 | 23,056 | 34,976 |
| Medreco | 7,278 | 12,313 | 10,861 | 12,875 | 24,578 |
| Tripoli | 13,973 | 9,188 | 9,202 | 10,181 | 10,398 |
| Gas oil | 414,319 | 244,430 | 324,884 | 367,301 | 410,808 |
| Medredo | 118,903 | 73,233 | 121,809 | 183,597 | 211,215 |
| Tripoli | 295,416 | 171,197 | 203,075 | 842,304 | 199,593 |
| Fuel oil | 813,511 | 621,628 | 579,494 | 842,304 | 949,814 |
| Medreco | 344,614 | 258,109 | 254,504 | 411,159 | 450,758 |
| Tripoli | 468,897 | 363,519 | 324,990 | 431,145 | 499,056 |
| Liquid gas | 63,142 | 28,785 | 32,763 | 33,160 | 19,824 |
| Medreco | 15,047 | 8,432 | 9,559 | 10,235 | 11,425 |
| Tripoli | 48,093 | 20,353 | 23,204 | 22,925 | 8,398 |

Comparing the amount of fuel subsidies with the budget deficit for 1982 and 1983, one notes that these subsidies caused 10 and 10.6 percent of the deficit respectively. That deficit is essentially financed by treasury bonds and in addition, by a debt to the Bank of Lebanon and foreign lenders. In order to estimate the inflationary role of the subsidies, one should compare the evolution in the budget deficit and the increase in the monetary mass.

We note that the budget deficit contributes to the increase in the monetary mass in an irregular, upward manner. The average of that contribution was 21 percent during the last 6 years studied.

We estimated that the contribution of subsidies to the budget deficit in 1982 was 10 percent, and that deficit contributed 34 percent of the increase in the monetary mass. Therefore, these subsidies contributed to 34 percent X 10 percent = 3.4 percent of the increase in the monetary mass in 1982.

Consequently, the subsidies are inflationary and contribute to the increase in prices. In 1982, that increase could be estimated at some 16 percent (average of indexes of the CGTL and the CCIB). The subsidies therefore contributed to about 21 percent of that price increase: 16 percent X 21 percent = 3.36 percent.

To this one must add the fact that these subsidies are on partially imported products, crude oil and especially gas. The growing deficit in local gas refining is illustrated by Graph 4 [below].

Table 6. Evolution of Cost of Producing 1 Kilogram of Bread Following Elimination of Fuel Oil Subsidy (in piasters)

| <u>Before Elimination</u> | | <u>After Elimination</u> | |
|--|--------|--|---------|
| Price of flour | 70 PL | Price of flour | 70 PL |
| Price of fuel oil | 3 PL | Price of fuel oil | 10 PL |
| Other costs of production and profits of bakery | 152 PL | Other costs of production and profits of bakery | 152 PL* |
| Total | 225 PL | Total | 232 PL |

The increase in the price of electric power resulting from the elimination in fuel subsidies and amounting to only a half piaster in the cost of 1 kilogram of bread was not included. Source: Ministry of Economy and Commerce.

The price of bread would therefore increase by 7 PL, or 3 percent.

Increase in Cost of Lighting and Heating

These increases can be estimated as in Table 7.

Table 7. Total Sales and Subsidies for Certain Types of Fuel in 1981

| <u>Type of Fuel</u> | <u>Total Sales (millions of LL)</u> | <u>Total Subsidies (millions of LL)</u> | <u>Percent of Subsidies</u> |
|--|---|---|---------------------------------|
| Gas oil | 1,100 | 208 | 18.90% |
| Lamp oil (kerosene for lighting) | 1,200 | 259 | 21.58% |
| Total | 2,300 | 467 | 20.03% |

Source: Letter from 1982 Budget, p 49.

These two products are essentially used to heat and light homes. Their price would go up about 20 percent on the average, which would therefore affect the price of heating and lighting homes by that amount.

Increase in Cost of Electric Power

Information available relating to the Office of Electricity of Lebanon (Letter from 1982 Budget, p 47) concerns 1981. For that year, fuel subsidies used at the power plants of that office amounted to 190 million LL for fuel oil and 31 million LL for gas oil, or a total of 221 million LL. Consumption of electric power from the OEL network in 1981 amounted to 2.6 billion kilowatt-hours. The subsidy per kilowatt-hour was therefore 8.5 PL. Elimination of gas oil and fuel oil subsidies would require an increase in the rate per kilowatt-hour of the same order. Considering 34 PL/kWh to be the average rate to the consumer (average of the rate for the first 100 kWh and that for the upper level at the time), the increase in the rate should be 25 percent in order not to increase the OEL deficit.

Direct Increase in Cost of Industrial Production Resulting From Elimination in Fuel Oil Subsidies

The amount of these subsidies was estimated at 30 million LL in 1981, while industrial production was estimated at 3 billion LL that same year. The direct increase in the cost of production would be an average of 1 percent. That increase must be weighed at 40 percent of its value, the latter percentage representing the share of Lebanese production in the use of industrial products in Lebanon.

Effect of Increases on Cost of Living

We can estimate that effect through coefficients used to estimate the 1980 price index. As far as we are concerned, the following coefficients should be retained:

The cost of heating, lighting and electricity made up 4.05 percent of an average family budget.

Costs of transportation and of a private automobile made up 5.2 percent of an average family budget.

Industrial products made up 20 percent of an average family budget.

We shall estimate the effect, using the above coefficients to weigh average percentages of increase in the corresponding items (see Table 4).

This gives us a total increase of 1.56 percent of the cost of living for an average household.

Overall Social and Economic Consequences

On an overall quantitative level, elimination of the subsidies would increase the cost of living by 1.56 percent, while these subsidies contribute to the increase in that cost to the extent of 3.4 percent. This might lead one to think that the lifting of subsidies on fuel would on the whole permit a drop in the rate of inflation of 3.4 percent - 1.56 percent = 1.84 percent a year on the average. This would seem to be true on the whole.

But most of the goods and services subsidized constitute more important items for the budgets of households with limited incomes than for wealthier households. Bread and public transportation are good examples.

In addition, the elimination of subsidies would positively affect the balance of payments. This, along with the reduction in the budget deficit, would raise the rate of exchange of the Lebanese pound compared with foreign currencies, thereby limiting the price increase on imported products and its impact on domestic prices. But this movement of the Lebanese pound would risk helping imports and hurting exports.

This policy of subsidies and their possible partial or total elimination can therefore only be considered from the purely financial standpoint. It must be placed within the framework of an economic and social policy of national development and advancement.

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CSO: 4419/7

IRAN

PROSECUTOR URGES RETURN OF PROPERTIES TO RIGHTFUL OWNERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Nov 85 pp 1-2

[Text] A meeting was held yesterday afternoon for members of Article 49 of the Constitution's special executive councils located in ministries and government organizations. The meeting, attended by Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi Khoini'ha, Prosecutor General, and Hojjat ol-Eslam Ramazani, Deputy Prosecutor General, took place at the Economic Affairs Office at the Economic Branch of the Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office.

After several verses were read from the glorious words of God, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ramazani discussed the problems and issues which have been raised by members of the special Constitution Article 49 executive groups, and called for more concern and attention for these issues.

Prosecutor General Hojjat ol-Eslam Khoini'ha then spoke on the implementation of Article 49 of the Constitution. He said: If we want to do what will please God and Islam and what the people are asking for, then the issues the brothers have raised can be resolved. If we are uncertain about whether to do this or not, however, certainly other problems will emerge if the existing ones are solved. If we consult the people, however, this idea is at least reflected in public opinion, among the oppressed people, those who were tormented under the former regime. In general (except a small group of sick and sinful people), our society wants the Islamic republic, and especially the judicial system, to do this (implement Article 49 of the Constitution), and to do so seriously and decisively, so that we can recover illegally obtained property from usurpers and return it to its rightful owners.

He added: This is being demanded by all segments of society, the clergy, the representatives of the Majlis, the country's high officials, the merchants and mid-level market people, and government office employees, with the exception of a small corrupted segment that lived in the service of that plundering

It is surprising to the people the way these corrupt people are still living more comfortably than others in the country. Why should the owner of a theater or a usurer who abused the rights of the people under the former regime have the courage now to complain to the prosecutor?

We should be so contemptuous of these corrupt people that they don't even have the courage to hold their heads up, much less to come and complain against the judicial apparatus.

This is what happens when our sensitivity weakens. If we do not raise our public sensitivity to perpetrators of sin and corruption, the plunderers of public wealth, and those who accumulate treasure from sacred wealth, they will become bold and rude. Is there as much public contempt in society today for usury as that shown with sensitivity in the Koran for instances of usury and sin?

Previously I spoke on the subject of not wearing veils. Now some ignorant people who do not understand the profundity of the matter are speaking out here and there. They say:

It is clear that the judicial powers have not yet set a specific policy for dealing with uncovered women. They say that these matters have economic roots, and their remarks are Marxist.

The people who say these things understand neither Marxism, Marxists, nor what I am saying. In any case, it is clearly a sin to go without a veil. No one has said it is permissible, so the practice of going uncovered must be fought, no one has said the cause should be abandoned.

What I say, however, is this: If believing and religious people who wish to please God are so contemptuous of uncovered women, why aren't they just as contemptuous of a usurer? Why don't they become as disturbed over the fact that a usurer is free today in the city streets of the Islamic republic as they do over the presence of an uncovered woman? This sensitivity is not in us, and since it is not you can see that they brought forth an item in the Constitution called Article 49, and its implementation was then delayed, until the Majlis took heed and wrote a pertinent law. However, it was passed only a short time ago and already we are lamenting the fact that it has problems here and there. If you and I had the sensitivity of which I am speaking, in the first month after passage we would have dealt with the problems in the implementation of Article 49, and they would have been solved by today.

IRAN

OFFICIAL ANNOUNCES PROPOSED PLAN FOR CONFISCATED LAND

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] Tonkabon--KEYHAN Correspondent--A plan has been prepared for utilizing thousands of hectares of confiscated lands in the north, including tens of orchards, villas, and factories. The supervisory council for these lands, which had prepared the plan and submitted it to the government, last week took the first steps to identify the owners of the villas, sell the orchard crops, and to study the manner of supervising factories constructed on confiscated land in the north.

In an interview with KEYHAN'S correspondent, the spokesman for the executive council for the supervision of the country's northern confiscated lands announced this and said:

This plan, which consists of proposals from members of the northern confiscated lands supervisory council, will stipulate the manner of utilization, the proportion of government shares, the villages in the region, and the forces which are ready for operation.

On the basis of this plan, a percentage of the principal or the proceeds of the lands with their improvements, including villas, citrus orchards, and factories, will be turned over to the government, and a portion will also be allocated to production plans for unemployed high school graduates. Another portion will also be allocated to villages in the region.

'Aynollah Setayesh, Tonkabon and Ramsar Revolutionary Prosecutor, spoke to our correspondent in the capacity of spokesman for the executive council for the supervision of the country's northern confiscated lands. He said:

After the order was issued by the Prosecutor General to confiscate the northern jungle lands of those affiliated with the former regime, known as 10-hectare parcel order, a council consisting of the Friday imams, the religious magistrates, the prosecutors' offices, and the municipal governors general was

IRAN

PAPER CRITICIZES REMARKS BY TURKEY'S OZAL

GF141542 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Jan 86 p 20

[Commentary: "Correct Mooting of a Problem Is Half of Its Solution"]

[Text] A high-ranking Turkish delegation completed its 3-day visit yesterday and departed Tehran. Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who led the delegation, held a press conference at the conclusion of his visit before leaving Tehran. He related the results of his visit. He answered correspondents' questions and explained the present ambiguities in Turkish foreign policy, especially Ankara's perception and stance concerning Iranian problems.

Soon after the arrival in Tehran of Mr Ozal and the Turkish delegation, we outlined some of these ambiguities and the need for a review of the Turkish viewpoints concerning related events. Publication of the Turkish prime minister's press conference and his explanation--not to mention his insistence vis-a-vis our current situation--has forced us to lay out our problems once again and to lay stress on the need for a reevaluation of the situation by Ankara. In laying out these problems we have tried to remain within the framework of the prime minister's questions and answers during yesterday's press conference. We leave the other questions for a more suitable opportunity.

Mr Ozal, who during his stay in Tehran, spoke mostly on bilateral trade relations, yesterday in his press conference, also laid stress on the same subject and abstained from answering basic questions on the imposed war and on the open threats of Iraq on the regional countries, including Turkey and... [elipses as published]

The Turkish prime minister states that he does not want to answer questions on who started the war and how it should end. It does not matter because the war, in fact, is a basic and fateful matter for Iran. All other matters should be seen in light of this and should be judged accordingly. Thus, it is as if in the midst of the Vietnam war, a person of authority--moreover, from a neighboring country--was to go to this country and in his press conference in Hanoi say: "Please let me talk nothing about the war."

The asked Mr Ozal who in his view started the war. He answered: "The answer to this question does not help solving the matter." It is a very vague answer. When you are in Iran how can you avoid talking about the war.

What did Mr Ozal do in Ankara? What is a black box and what does he mean by following up the matter? The Iraqis have given a clear reply to the request and the black box will say the same thing. Why doesn't Mr Ozal do something? It is now one week since the incident. How long it will take for the inquiries to be completed?

If Turkey's economic or strategic interests require him to keep silent about the imposed war, would not his national interests force him to take action against such open blackmail? Where is the limit to one country's interests? He says that he would like to be a bridge between the West and the world of Islam. If he means Iran, then he has no interest in building a bridge that ends to the West, but if he means Kuwait and Egypt, they have bridges of their own. In other words, there is no distance between Cairo and Washington. He says that he would like to bring unity among the Islamic countries. Unity among whom and for what? Unity for the sake of unity or unity in face of an event, phenomenon, or a hostility?

Come and join in the union of Iran, Libya, and Syria. For years it has been the object of all unions in the Middle East and in the Arab territories to confront imperialism and Zionism. Mr Ozal says that Turkey is a member of NATO and that its relations with Israel are out of necessity. How can he bring unity and with whom? God grant that such unity would not be like the unity between Egypt and Jordan, so that he could in a group and along with others proceed to Tel Aviv.

Concerning the hostile and insulting attacks of the Turkish press in the face of the honorable values in the Islamic Republic, Mr Ozal says: "Press in Turkey is free. The way to stop these insults is for the Iranian authorities to invite them to visit Iran so that they could see for themselves, know things, and say nothing." If the Turkish press is free, then why do the head of the Turkish correspondents and the members of the Turkish delegation say: "While contracting Turkish correspondents do not talk about war end....[elipses as published] and only talk of detent between the correspondents of the two countries." If he decides that the Turkish correspondents should see and hear, how can he say they are free?

Besides, have we stopped them from visiting Iran? Have we invited the correspondents from other friendly countries and have we bribed them because they write the truth? Moreover, what is the press mission of our Turkish colleagues? do they write similar "facts" on other matters also? Do they write truth only when they are invited? If not, from where do they bring the facts that they write about? Do others invite them so that they should write to their benefit? If so, woe be to us and to the Turkish nation that their correspondents are only "invitees." Should we also write and say whatever we want to, lies and untruths, insults and accusations, and then say that it is because they have not invited us? Let them invite us so that we may write about facts? We know that the answer is very simple: If you do not know, give up your pens and do not write. If you want to write, then go and see, then write. In conclusion, we would say that we hope that last night's V.P. report about the "visit of Ozal to Iraq date of which has not yet been fixed" is not true, but if it is true, we hope that Mr Ozal will tell the truth at least in Iraq.

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CSO: 4640/145

their morale. They started this work on a contract basis after the revolution and it is part of the necessary [word indistinct] projects. (?It was part of foreign contracts), but we ousted them and took over and operated it; and today it is classed as one of the major projects in the country, which has been operated by our own expert manpower. By operating this it will be proved that our technician brothers are capable of erecting and operating immense projects which seem incredible to foreigners.

[Correspondent] Would you please explain the reasons behind the delay in operating this and what can be done in order to [words indistinct]?

[Aqazadeh] In the beginning there were some delays because of the difficulties with the related contractors and their various organizations. After solving those problems and gaining confidence that we are capable of starting the works ourselves the job started two or three years ago. Our difficulties today arise from the manufacturers of these systems, because the manufacturers are not here when we start the systems. Each system is guaranteed by the manufacturers, but they are not here at the time of operation in order to solve the operating problems. Of course, today our experts here promised that they can rely on themselves and can start the operation without the presence of the manufacturers; and they are going to do this and we hope that during our talks we will persuade the related manufacturers to come to Iran to observe the operation. This observation does not mean that we need them; rather we are saying that they have manufactured these systems and installations for us and have guaranteed that there will be no problems and that they will change the faulty parts. We need their presence for this purpose only. However, when the systems are left idle and are not working the losses are very heavy. Therefore, we have to start the operation ourselves, albeit without some of the parts that we may have not received. And we are determined to start the operation and that is why I have come here in order to talk to the experts here and take the necessary steps.

[Correspondent] When do you think it will start work?

[Aqazadeh] Our expert brothers have promised me that they will operate this within the next four months, at the latest.

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total capital expenditure of 760 million dollars is to begin shortly. The bank of industries and mines has 35 projects totaling two billion dollars under study for which he said over 12,000 workers would be employed once the projects are completed. Shafe'i said the cabinet has allocated the equivalent in rials of 2.56 billion dollars to the ministry of industries to be extended to production industries according to the urgency of their financial need for the current Iranian year (began 21 March). [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1735 GMT 7 Jan 86 LD] /12913

CORRUPTION IN CABINET--After some Majlis deputies referred to unlawful goings on in the Ministry of Heavy Industries and the Commerce Ministry, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Islamic Majlis, said: Of course, there are such things in the government, but if we are realists we recognize that these things cannot be debated in the Majlis. If we do not control our speeches, tomorrow our leader and others may tell us: "Mind your own business." The Majlis deputies should keep in mind that the leader is also unhappy about this. Moreover, these matters could be taken advantage of by opponents, anti-revolution elements, and foreigners. Eventually it would go against the revolution. The words exchanged between Rafsanjani and the Majlis deputies were not correctly covered by the press, but were broadcast directly through the 'FM' transmitter. [Excerpt] [London KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jan 86 p 15] /9274

PAPER ON TRAINING, SECURITY--KEYHAN Political Service--The Information and Security Academy meant for training information officials, interrogators, and heads and officials of the Islamic Republic prisons in which political prisoners are kept, will open next Farvardin [21 March-20 April] and will impart training, in addition to the Iranian trainees, to train from Islamic and the Arab countries. According to reports received from the Arab sources in the Persian Gulf, a large number of young men from Persian Gulf Arab countries and Africa are being sent for training to Iran via Europe by the Islamic Republic embassies in those countries. They will receive training in the classes held in the security academy of the Islamic regime. A team of Korean and Syrian security specialists, who are even now cooperating with the information organization of the regime along with groups of penitent mujahedin known by the name of "Tawabin" [those who have expressed their penitence], will impart necessary training to the trainees in the Information and Security Academy. [Text] [London KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jan 86 p 15 GF] /9274

TRANSMITTER REPORTEDLY BLOWN UP--One of the regime's radio transmitters which beams signals outside the country has stopped functioning. The correspondent for the Voice of the Liberation of Iran says in this regard: At midnight on 1 January, the antenna of the powerful radio transmitter at Tayyebat on the Afghan border broadcasting on 7230 KHZ to export Khomeyni's revolution propaganda to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, was destroyed. The antenna was blown up by an unknown group which planted explosives at its base. The report goes on to say that one helicopter, which had gone to the area to help to send some technicians on Monday, was forced to flee due to heavy antiaircraft fire by the Afghan Mujahidin. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Liberation of Iran in Persian 1630 GMT 9 Jan 86 GF] /12913

PAKISTAN

REPATRIATION FUND TO HONOR ZIA-UL-HAQ COMMITMENT

Karachi DAWN in English 12 Jan 86 p 10

[Text]

KARACHI, Jan 11: Lord Ennals said on Saturday that the international Trust created for the repatriation and settlement of stranded Pakistanis in Daka will honour the solemn commitment made by President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq.

Addressing a reception given in his honour by the National Repatriation Council at Hotel Jabees, he said the President's statements have been warmly welcomed in Pakistan as has been evidenced by the unanimous vote by the Senate.

Replying to the welcome address presented by Mr M. Raziq Khan, president of the committee, Lord Ennals said that the Trust created with people from five nations can give international bank guarantees that the money is available to cover transportation, construction of houses, etc.

"It is the hope of the Trust, which has as its vice-chairman Admiral (retd) Mohammad Sharif, that the Government of Pakistan will accept this generous international gesture and the guarantees that the whole programme will be implemented as planned and the 14-year-old issue of bringing the people from Dhaka will be resolved," he said.

Lord Ennals said he will be leaving on Sunday for Dhaka to talk to the leaders of the stranded Pakistanis and the government officials.

He will return to Karachi on Tuesday and attend the meeting of the trustees and leave the next day for London.

Mr Afaq Shahid, MNA from Orangi and leader of the Bihari community, has urged the Government to accord recognition to the Trust.

Speaking at a reception in Orangi on Friday given in his honour by the National Repatriation Council, the MNA said that the Government should include representatives from provinces in the Trust and give a go-ahead signal to start work in connection with resettlement.

He saw no reason for the delay when the Senate has adopted a unanimous resolution for the repatriation.

The meeting was also addressed by Mrs Qamarunnisa Qamar, MNA, who suggested the creation of Prime Minister's Fund for the repatriation.

Others who addressed the meeting were Mr Ahmed E.H. Jaffer, Mr Zafar Imam, Mr Jamal-ul-Haq Siddiqui and Mr Waheed Hussain.

The Lord and the Lady were presented gifts on behalf of the Council.

PPI adds:

Lord Ennals on Saturday also presented a goblet with insignia of the British House of Commons to

Mr Ahmed E.H. Jaffer, Chairman, English Speaking Union of Pakistan, in recognition of his services towards promoting UK-Pakistan relations.

He presented the goblet at a lunch hosted by Mr Jaffer, in his honour.

He spoke of the efforts made by Mr Jaffer in strengthening the relations between Pakistan and Great Britain.

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CSO: 4600/182

purse and the patience of their hosts. Can we afford the presence in our midst of such a large host, armed and welded together by tribal loyalties?

Kashmir was more sacred to us than Afghanistan. Indeed, the latter used to be one of our principal enemies. But the harsh realities of war and peace led to a severe downgrading of our enthusiasm for that question. Should not a similar sense of reality shape our response to the problem of Afghanistan.

The time may have come when Pakistan should look at the problem with a fresh mind. The signals being sent by the Russians should be examined carefully. They are letting no opportunity go by without proclaiming their desire to pull out of Afghanistan. This was the message discreetly conveyed by Soviet spokesmen at the time of the Geneva summit. Significantly, the report in the *New York Times* that the Afghan Foreign Minister had informally conveyed a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops to Mr Diego Cordovez has yet to be denied. The recent *Pravda* editorial on Afghanistan also took a moderate line, supporting the efforts of the Kabul regime to broaden its social and political base.

In return Kabul and Moscow are insisting on direct negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan when the recessed sixth round of the Geneva talks reopens. Suppose the Soviets are bluffing and have no intention of withdrawal. In that case, why not call their bluff? The Americans talked directly to the Chinese years before formal recognition. Mr Kissinger conducted regular negotiations with Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam when the war in the south was at its height. What then is the wisdom in standing on a quibble when so much of substance is at stake? Refusing direct talks at this stage means taking the onus for a breakdown of peace efforts on ourselves. Agreeing to them, on the other hand, puts Moscow under pressure to produce a peace formula. If it does not, its fraud is imposed before the whole world.

Our enemies say that our Afghan policy is tailored to suit American interests. They also say that unless Washington gives the go-ahead signal, Pakistan is in no position to take an independent initiative on this question. Unless we are to prove that this is true, it is time a lie was given to this sedulous propaganda.

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS CLOSING OF LAHORE FORT SUBJAIL

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Jan 86 p 5

[Text]

THE decision by the Punjab Government to abolish the sub-jail at Lahore Fort will be widely welcomed. One of the foremost archaeological sites of the subcontinent, the Lahore Fort has earned wide notoriety for its association with a torture and interrogation cell located there, which is used to extract information from political leaders and workers under duress. Used as residential quarters by the Mughal rulers of the subcontinent, the Fort was converted to serve as garrison headquarters under the British. But once the independence movement gained momentum the British turned the Fort into a torture cell to hold and 'soften up' political prisoners. Unfortunately, this practice continued even after independence. Among the many, famous and otherwise, who passed through these precincts perhaps the most well-known in the post-independence period was Hasan Nasir, who is regarded by many as our first martyr to the cause of populism. In recent years the Fort has figured prominently in Amnesty International reports, much to the discredit of the country's political system.

However, while welcoming

the decision of the Provincial Government not to detain political prisoners in the Lahore Fort any longer, it is regrettable that the premises will continue to be used as an interrogation centre for the Special Branch to question suspects, agents, spies, smugglers and other criminals. The Lahore Fort forms an invaluable part of our cultural heritage. For the authorities to use its premises for carrying out deeds which give a sinister reputation to the Fort shows a total, almost callous, disregard of the spirit and tradition of this great monument and of our cultural heritage in general. The Archaeology Department has for the last fourteen years been asking the Government to turn the entire area over to its jurisdiction for preservation and tourism purposes. This should be done without delay. The Special Branch can always find another place to house its interrogation cell. In any case, the cell at the Lahore Fort has over the years acquired such a foul reputation that any interrogation carried out there, for whatever purpose, will cause suspicious eyebrows to be raised and the odium will continue to reflect on the reputation of the Fort.

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CSO: 4600/182

PAKISTAN

TALKS FOR WORLD BANK LOAN UNDER WAY

Karachi DAWN in English (BUSINESS supplement) 13 Jan 86 p I

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Jan 12: Negotiations are in progress between World Bank and Pakistan for 23 loans totalling 1.5 billion dollars for various sectors of economy and projects, official sources here said.

Two important loans are meant for agricultural sector, being negotiated by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Cooperative and Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP), 150 million dollars loan being sought by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture is meant to support a programme of structural reforms to include setting of investment priorities, rationalisation of incentives and strengthening of institutions.

LOAN FOR ADBP: A loan of 45 million dollars is being negotiated by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan meant for the lending operations of the Bank to farmers.

It may be pointed out that the Bank has already announced a 148 million dollars loan for disbursement of credit through the commercial banks to industrial enterprises. An export development loan of 70 million dollars is being sought by the Finance Ministry for supporting the industrial policy changes, particularly in export development and deregulation.

Officials believe that the number of World Bank aided projects is in fact an appreciation by the world lending organisation of various measures undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the Government for liberalising the economy and allocating a bigger share to the private sector in the process of national development.

PRIVATISATION: As for example, a 30 million dollars loan has been sought for Privatisation of the Tubewells in the SCARP (Soil Claim and Reclamation Projects) areas since a UNDP funded SCARP transition study has established that tubewells in the private sector are more efficient and economical than in the public sector. The study proposed that since scarcity of resources were hampering efficient working of the SCARP, tubewells in the fresh ground water areas should be transferred to the local farmers.

A loan of 100 million dollars is being negotiated for telecommunication project and 70 million dollar for undertaking work on 740 kilometer long sections of the Karachi-Peshawar highway by the National Highway Board.

Three loans valuing 180 million dollars are being negotiated by Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) for the thermal rehabilitation programme and setting up of a combined cycle power plant at Kot Adu near Multan, where work on four turbines of 100 megawatt each was already in progress.

Other loans envisage energy conservation programme at National Refinery Limited (21 million dollars), an energy conservation programme for various public and private sector enterprises (50 million dollars), modernisation of the cement industry (100 million dollars), primary education improvement and second vocational training programme costing 70 and 50 million dollars respectively. —PPI

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CSO: 4600/183

PAKISTAN

PAPER EXPLAINS CAUSES OF INCREASED ELECTRICITY DEMAND

Karachi DAWN in English (BUSINESS Supplement) 13 Jan 86 p IV

[Text]

KARACHI, Jan 12: The load-shedding in the country was the resultant factor of unprecedented increase in demand for electrical power. The experts had estimated increase in the demand as 7 to 8 per cent, whereas, graph of the increase in domestic sector only traversed 30 per cent.

The major cause of the increase in the use of electricity in the domestic sector was the excess of money. At present there were about 125,000 tubewells in the villages running on the WAPDA system and it was essential to run the tubewells to achieve the target of better crop yield.

The industrial units in the country and the use of present day electrical gadgets such as television and radio sets, VCR's electric irons, airconditioners, heaters, sewing machines, washing machines, etc., in the households have also increased abundantly.

The hydro-electric oriented power system of WAPDA comprised 65 per cent of hydel generation. The basis of producing more

hydel power compared to thermal was that import of oil was not required for generating electricity utilising the country's river water potential. When the lakes were full, maximum of electrical power could be generated and the problem of shortage of electricity arose when water in the rivers was scarce.

Normally Tarbela hydel power station produced 1750 mw of electricity and when the lake was full to brim, it generated upto 2000 mws, however, in the months of May and June with the depletion of Tarbela reservoir and in the absence of flow into the lake, the Tarbela power house gave only 350 mws of electrical energy.

Similarly, Mangla hydel power house in these months could be run to generate more 60 mws instead of 1000 mws in the favourable conditions. This shortage of power generation from Tarbela and Mangla spreads from December to June and the situation was eased with the rains in July when the lakes were full of water.—PPI

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CSO: 4600/183